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und Außenpolitik

Lisa Sieger

International Mediation in Northern Ireland.
An Analysis of the Influence of International
Intermediaries on the Process and the
Outcome of the Northern Irish Peace Process
from 1994 to mid-2004



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ABSTRACT

The study of international mediation has received a lot of attention in recent political science. However, the main focus appears to lie on case studies dealing with the role of international intermediaries in conflicts *between* states. Less research seems to exist in the field of *intra-national* conflicts.

The following article will deal with the role of international mediators in the Northern Ireland peace process during the ten years before mid-2004. It will examine whether international actors could foster perceptual de-escalation, or rather a “de-escalation of minds” among the internal political conflict parties, rather than simply contributing to structural changes, e.g. a re-organisation of the inter-party relationship in the form of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Such a potential perceptual de-escalation would be crucial in order for structural changes to remain stable. Otherwise, it could be very likely that positive structural changes might be destroyed once again due to renewed escalation on the subjective level of conflict.

The empirical analysis will be conducted by using a newly developed combination of Werner Link’s concept of conflict, a modified escalation model based on the works of the authors Fisher and Keashly and of Jacob Bercovitch’s “contingency model” of international mediation. In line with this theoretical framework, the mediation efforts in Northern Ireland and their effects on the conflict parties’ perceptions will be at the centre of a qualitative empirical case study. In the case of the internal conflict parties, a substantial speech analysis will show how the parties’ perceptions, specifically their perceived interests, have changed on an escalation scale ranging from I to IV. In the case of the international mediators, the strategies used in the same period were put under closer scrutiny by conducting both a speech and an event analysis. The combined data will show whether or not international mediators did have a significant impact on the conflict parties’ perceptions and what implications this might have for international mediation in intra-national conflict situations.

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Absolventin der Politischen Wissenschaft an der Universität zu Köln

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International Mediation in Northern Ireland. An Analysis of the Influence of International Intermediaries on the Process and the Outcome of the Northern Irish Peace Process from 1994 to mid-2004

1 Introduction

The Northern Ireland conflict: an intra-national conflict situation which has been examined on a regular basis and which is still in a state of instability despite repeated attempts at conflict resolution. In 1993, a promising peace process began, which attempted to bring the “Troubles”, which originated in 1969, to an end once and for all. After a long negotiation process conducted with the help of the British and Irish governments and, in particular, with international – mainly American – support, the conflict parties managed to reach a cross-community settlement: the “Good Friday Agreement” (GFA). Independent chairmen witnessed the negotiations but also *actively* suggested solutions, while international actors handled the contentious topic of paramilitary decommissioning before, during and even after the central negotiation process. These efforts were also underlined by well-timed visits of former US President Bill Clinton.

The GFA is based on the principle of consociation; it is aimed at empowering both the Catholic and the Protestant communities and, at the same time, at being in line with their particular traditions. However, the initial enthusiasm after the signing of the Agreement subsided very quickly, due to the difficulties throughout the implementation process and the continuing incidents of paramilitary violence. With regard to the realisation of the terms of the GFA, the topics of decommissioning and policing in particular make it difficult to reach a compromise and, therefore, hinder long-term conflict regulation.¹ How the future of the Agreement will unfold seems to depend mainly on the commitment and the perceptions of the different parties involved. However, the election results from November 2003 and the results of the European election from June 2004 show that there seemed to be a general feeling of dissatisfaction among the Northern Irish population, especially among unionists.² Therefore, in early February 2004 a new revision process began, during which the Agreement was supposed to undergo various modifications. If this process would not lead to a positive result, it seemed possible that the document would be declared a failure.

The original study on which this article is based was conducted in 2004, and therefore the empirical results presented here do not take into account what has occurred since.³ However, it seems appropriate to mention that the revision process did in fact end in another stalemate. Moreover, a number of developments such as a multi-million Pound bank robbery in Northern Ireland, the alleged IRA involvement in the murder of the Northern Irish Catholic Robert McCartney and

1 The difference between the terms "conflict resolution" and "conflict regulation" is here based on the terminology used by Werner Link (see 1988). While a "resolution" aims at a form of "solution", a "regulation" does not necessarily lead to a complete solution. It rather implies a change in certain aspects of the relationship, either on the structure- or agent-level. The term "conflict regulation" will become important again further on in chapter 2.

2 The recent election results can be found at <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/> (date last viewed: 29.01.2006).

3 The original German thesis "Internationale Mediation in Nordirland – Eine Untersuchung des Einflusses internationaler Drittparteien auf den Ablauf und das Outcome des nordirischen Friedensprozesses" can be found at <http://www.politik.uni-koeln.de/jaeger/downloads/sieger02.pdf> (date last viewed: 29.01.2006) on the Internet.

further accusations of increased criminal activity by the IRA stalled the negotiations once again. The most recent events include an IRA-statement in which the paramilitary organisation instructs its members to lay down their arms and to pursue their goals through exclusively political channels and, apart from that, the so far most substantial act of IRA-decommissioning on September 26th 2005. Some commentators have regarded these developments as a breakthrough, others, mainly members of the Protestant DUP, argue that decommissioning has still not been transparent enough.

The questions raised in the original study from 2004 were: why exactly did the conflict fall back into such a regressive phase? Why are contentious issues like decommissioning, which have already led to ongoing differences before the start of the “multi-party talks”, still not resolved today? And what role did international mediators play in this process?

Firstly, the peace process seems to be mainly aimed at changing the *structure* of the system of relations between the actors involved. This change is supposed to enable the parties to pursue their opposing interests through democratic channels so that there would be no need for violence or intimidation. But can a substantial change in the situation be achieved at all, if only the organisation of the parties' relations is being modified without integrating the differently perceived interests? And what do international mediators concentrate on throughout their efforts? Are they actually able to change these opposing interests, which lie at the heart of the conflict?

In addition to this, it seemed in 2004 as if the influence of international actors had decreased again over time. Had they lost interest in regulating this particular conflict due to a change of priorities in the international arena? And what effect did the change in the US administration after the election of George W. Bush have on the developments in the Northern Irish peace process?

As a research area in political science the topic of international mediation has received more and more attention since the 1960s.⁴ New projects in the area of conflict and peace research have included a series of large-scale empirical studies which were supposed to test the influence and the success of international mediation efforts in the international political arena (Bercovitch and Houston 1996, p. 11-35).

However, in international politics the emphasis primarily lies on conflicts *between* states; less research seems to exist in the field of *intra-national* conflicts and attempts at resolving them by international intermediaries. Due to the lack of research in this field and due to the recent developments in Northern Ireland, it seemed relevant to analyse this conflict situation in detail. In his article "The Role of International Mediation in the Northern Ireland Peace Process", Kevin King (2000) enumerates four aspects, which have so far provided positive input throughout the negotiation process. Firstly, new initiatives were developed between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland; secondly, new propositions were made about how the issue of decommissioning could be separated from the remaining points underlying the negotiations; thirdly, the parties turned out to be very patient and willing to take new risks; finally, the author mentions the intervention of an international institution, the International Body on Decommissioning (IBD), under the chairmanship of the former US Senator George Mitchell, which led to the introduction of the so-called "Mitchell Principles"⁵, which were adopted during the negotiations leading up to the GFA later on. International actors have therefore *actively* contributed to the regulation of the conflict and used their influence. Due to the fact that King's article was written shortly after the GFA was reached and therefore still stresses the success of the mediation efforts (ibid. 2000, p. 210-211), it

4 In order to gain a historical overview over the beginnings of mediation research, see, for instance, Bercovitch 1996, p. 1-3. On the different areas in which mediation can be used, for example, in interpersonal conflict regulation, see Wall et al. 2001, p. 371; and Bercovitch 1992, p. 1-2.

5 The "Mitchell Principles" demanded of the parties to renounce any type of violence if they wanted to take part in the GFA-negotiations (King 2000, p. 182).

seemed appropriate in 2004 to analyse this process once more from a contemporary perspective. Building on King's results, the "success" of the mediation efforts in Northern Ireland will be examined in this paper once again by looking at the last ten years of the peace process in order to find out why these efforts have not led to stable change; in addition, the role that the perceptions and interests of the involved conflict parties have played in this process will be analysed.

Throughout this study, the following questions will be at the centre of attention: How much influence have international mediators had on the development of the Northern Irish peace process since 1994 and, in which way have these efforts changed the perceived interests of the conflict parties? Is it possible to show a trend towards de-escalation on the level of the perceived interests despite the fact that a final solution to the conflict has not yet been found? Therefore, based on the political developments in Northern Ireland up to mid-2004, the following hypothesis will function as the central assumption of this study: international mediators have indeed contributed substantially to a temporary *structural* change of the conflict situation in Northern Ireland (by achieving the GFA); however, on the level of perceptions, especially of the actors' interests, they could not foster a genuine trend towards de-escalation, but only a limited one. As a result, this has led to a stagnation of the peace process on the structural level and to an ineffective implementation process throughout the last six years up to mid-2004.

In order to analyse the influence of international mediators on the Northern Irish peace process, first, this paper will outline the theoretical foundation upon which the following empirical study is based. Especially, the link between the processes of escalation and mediation has to be clarified. Furthermore, the nature of conflict and the distinction between its subjective and objective dimensions will be dealt with since this is crucial for the later empirical analysis. The examination of the mediation process will orient itself along the lines of Jacob Bercovitch's "contingency model" of international mediation, which tries to capture the dynamic nature of the process.

The different theoretical approaches will be combined and applied to the conflict situation in Northern Ireland. The relevant variables in this case will be identified and put into context. Subsequently, the outcome of the mediation efforts will become the centre of the study. The outcome can be divided into effects on the objective and the subjective levels of conflict. The emphasis in this particular study will be placed on the consequences for the “subjective” level of conflict, here the area of the perceived interests of the main conflict parties. By using the CAQDAS⁶-program “maxqda”, a systematic analysis of the existing speeches and statements released by these parties throughout the peace process until mid-2004 has been conducted, in order to expose a trend of perceptual de-escalation or escalation and to find out how this trend is connected to the influence of international actors.

Apart from that, the strategies applied by the most important international intermediaries will be examined by taking a closer look at their speeches and statements, again by using “maxqda”; this textual analysis will be combined with an analysis of those relevant events in which an international intermediary participated, and together these results will be evaluated according to a mediation strategy model developed by Touval and Zartman.⁷ Using the combined results of this study, an attempt will be made to explain why the mediation efforts in Northern Ireland have not led to complete success on the structural level or, rather, why the GFA has not been fully implemented yet. In addition, the obstacles which hinder international mediators from substantially regulating the conflict will be exposed. What difference did the participation of international actors actually make?

The speeches and statements are taken from the CAIN-database⁸, which includes a collection of source documents from the beginning of the peace process in

6 CAQDAS is an acronym for Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software; for an overview of this type of qualitative data analysis see Fielding and Lee 1998.

7 On the mediation strategy model according to Touval and Zartman see Bercovitch 1992, p. 16.

8 The CAIN-database can be found on the Internet at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/> (date last viewed: 29.01.2006). The website contains very useful information on the Northern Ireland conflict and its background.

1993 until today and which is generally highly appreciated by academics as offering important resources on the Northern Ireland conflict and its development (e.g. in Hausdewell and Brown 2002). Additionally, the documents used in this study have been complemented by selected speeches and statements released by international actors which had not been included in this database but which are nonetheless crucial for the analysis.⁹

2 Conflict – Escalation – Mediation – the Theoretical Background

Since the following study deals with international mediation as a means of non-violent conflict regulation, it is necessary to clearly define the term “conflict” before proceeding.¹⁰ According to Werner Link, a conflict can be defined as “a process throughout which incompatible (or seemingly incompatible) tendencies can lead to a critical tension, because (1) the actors become conscious of this incompatibility and (2) this will determine their actions *and* (3) the organisation or structure of the political entity which integrates the actors will be potentially or actually endangered”.¹¹ This definition integrates two important elements of the debate about the subjective and the objective character of a conflict. Due to the fact that the actors have to become aware of the seemingly incompatible tendencies, which are interpreted here as *interests*, and that these have to determine their actions in order for a conflict situation to become critical, a subjective dimension can be identified: the actors *perceive* the relationship and their interests and *interpret* both.

9 See the bibliography for references to those websites from which the documents were taken which were not included in the CAIN-database.


10 On different theoretical approaches on conflict also see Cheldelin et. al 2003.

11 See Link 1988, p. 40 for the original German definition, which was faithfully translated into English for this paper. Italics were taken over from the original.

The third aspect of the definition, the critical tension, which impacts on the system of relations, implies the objective dimension of the conflict. A destruction or reorganisation of this system of relations can be verified objectively by looking at structural changes. However, it must be noted that both dimensions of conflict always have a mutual impact on one another (see Link 1988, p. 40 and Figure 1 below). This distinction between the objective and subjective levels of conflict is of great importance, because, according to Bercovitch, the mediation process can be analysed on both levels.

One might wonder why Link's definition of conflict is being used in this context, since it seems to stress the structural dimension more, whereas the focus in this study lies on the conflict parties' perceptions. In fact, the definition does not negate the influence of the actors' perceptions. On the contrary, the perception of the seemingly incompatible interests can lead to a critical tension and thereby to a change of the organisation of the relationship. If a change in the organisation does occur, it can have an impact on the perceptions once again; it becomes evident that both dimensions depend on one another. For the case of Northern Ireland this means that even if the system of relations has been structurally changed, this does not necessarily mean that the actors' perceptions have followed. And if the seemingly incompatible interests are not dismantled, this could once more lead to a critical tension and, as a last consequence, to a destruction of the organisation of the relationship.

Figure 1 The mutual influence of the levels of structure and perceptions on one another (new visualisation based on Singer's four ideal types of conflict regulation)



According to Link, the critical tension is most likely to disappear if non-violent means of conflict regulation are being applied, for instance, mediation. As Jacob Bercovitch points out, mediation can serve as a promising alternative, especially if the conflict is of a long-term and protracted nature, if previous initiatives of the conflict parties have not achieved any progress, if these conflict parties would like to prevent further escalation and further costs, and if they are willing to begin a mutual dialogue.¹²

Defining the term “mediation” is a difficult venture. Different authors stress either the actions or aims of the mediators, differentiate between international mediation and other types of intervention by third parties or describe attributes of the mediators; but, their definitions often tend to be too one-sided. Bercovitch argues that mediation cannot be viewed as static but rather as *dynamic*, since it adapts and responds to the development of the conflict. This will be clarified further when introducing Bercovitch’s “contingency model” of international mediation later on.

¹² See Bercovitch 1995, p. 90.

First of all, the term mediation has to be clearly defined, and Bercovitch attempts to formulate a definition which takes into account the conflict parties and the mediator as well as the context and the process of mediation:

Mediation is here defined as a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law. (Bercovitch 1997, p. 130)

This definition contains all those elements which determine the nature and the efficiency of mediation and, additionally, it captures the dynamic nature of the mediation process. However, before introducing the previously mentioned "contingency model" in detail, it seems appropriate to take a closer look at the processes of escalation and de-escalation, due to the fact that the success or failure of mediation efforts is determined to a great extent by changes in the conflict intensity.

According to Kriesberg, a conflict runs through several phases, and the stages of escalation and de-escalation are part of this life cycle (see Kriesberg 2003, p. 23). It is possible that a conflict does not finish its cycle entirely, that it stagnates or falls back into a previous phase, e.g. the phase of escalation. In the case of an unresolved conflict the escalation process is never completed, regardless of whether a parallel de-escalation process has been initiated or whether a settlement has been reached which still needs to be fully implemented.


Jeffrey Rubin defines escalation as an increase in intensity¹³; this opinion is shared by most authors. But this definition is far too broad, because as part of the

13 On Rubin's definition of the escalation see Tamra Pearson d'Estrée's paper on conflict dynamics in Cheldelin et. al 2003, p. 68.

escalation process a number of subprocesses take place which concern, for instance, a change in the parties' interests or their preferred strategies.

The escalation model being used here is based on a model originally developed by the authors Fisher and Keashly, but has been modified to distinguish better between the objective and subjective levels of conflict and to be in line with Link's conflict terminology.¹⁴ The four escalation stages in this modified model are (I) *integration*, (II) *polarisation*, (III) *segregation/regression* and (IV) *destruction*.¹⁵

Figure 2 The four levels of escalation visualised as an escalation scale.



The different levels on which a conflict can escalate are then as follows (see Table 1):

¹⁴ On the four stages of escalation and the escalation model according to Fisher and Keashly on which our modified version is based see Fisher 1997, p. 166. Originally, the model was based on the works of Glasl and Deutsch.

¹⁵ In this model integration is not to be understood as an entirely peaceful process, by which the conflict as a whole would be resolved; rather, it should be viewed as steps towards political integration.

Table 1 The different dimensions of conflict escalation, on both the objective and subjective levels of conflict

DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT								
	OBJECTIVE				SUBJECTIVE			
	<i>communication</i>	<i>interaction</i>	<i>structure of relationship</i>	<i>preferred conflict strategy</i>	<i>perception of interests</i>	<i>perception of power relation</i>	<i>perception of relationship</i>	<i>outcome-assessment</i>
I	discussion / debate / direct communication	formalised negotiations / direct interaction	integrative or on the way towards integration	integrative-cooperative / constructive	integration; access to political institutions	integrative combination of structural and institutional power	integrative or on the way towards integration	joint gain / integration
II	informal discussion / less direct communication	shortly before entering or leaving negotiations / less direct interaction	between integrative and regressive	between integrative-cooperative and regressive-confrontative	integration or "status quo"	change of asymmetrical power relationship	between integrative and regressive	compromise or relapse
III	indirect communication	indirect interaction / threats	regressive / endangering relationship	regressive-confrontative	"basic needs"; securing structural resources	asymmetrical power relationship	regressive / endangering relationship	win-lose
IV	communication non-existent	antagonistic interaction / direct violent attacks	destruction of relationship / isolation or revolution	destructive	realisation of ultimate goal	survival / "power struggle"	destruction of relationship / isolation or revolution	lose-lose

On the objective level, changes in communication, interaction, the structure of the relationship and the strategies of the conflict parties are at the centre of interest. The subjective level contains the perception of interests, of how power is allocated, of the relationship itself and the assessment of the conflict outcome. In the following empirical study, emphasis will be placed upon the perceived interests; the study will therefore deal with an element belonging to the subjective level of conflict.¹⁶

In accordance with Link's terminology, a development from escalation stage I to III could be interpreted as regressive, whereas a movement in the other direction could be seen as rather integrative, since it also implies de-escalation. Stage IV is

¹⁶ Even though the other three subjective factors will not be examined in more detail, an analysis of the escalation process of the perceived interests does carry implications for the other subjective elements as well. For example, if a conflict party's primary interest is the accumulation of resources, this implies that the power relationship is seen as asymmetrical and that the relationship as such is seen as threatened. The expected outcome would be a win-lose scenario.

equivalent to Link's idea of a complete destruction of the system of relations, in this case an isolation or revolution.

However, de-escalation does not simply imply a process of "walking back down the staircase of intensity" (Fisher 1997, p. 175). Pruitt and Rubin argue that: "[D]e-escalation is more than reverse escalation, for escalation creates 'residues' that must be removed for de-escalation to succeed" (quoted *ibid.* 1997, p. 175). This means that an escalating conflict can lead to certain changes in the system of relations, which make it difficult or might even make it impossible to turn back. Moreover, there is a high danger of de-escalation efforts to be interrupted by further incidents of escalation, as can be seen in the case of Northern Ireland.¹⁷ But what role can international mediators play in this process of de-escalation?


Bercovitch's contingency model

The previous passages have shown that international mediation cannot be regarded as a one-dimensional cause-effect process (see Bercovitch 1992, p. 18), but rather must be seen as a complex interplay of various aspects. According to his previously introduced definition of the term "mediation", Jacob Bercovitch suggests a model which integrates the different dimensions of this reactive and adaptive process: the so-called "contingency model".¹⁸

17 See Fisher 1997, p. 176 on a model of de-escalation developed by Louis Kriesberg. This model divides the de-escalation process up into different stages, e.g. the stage of pre-negotiations, of explicit negotiations, of an explicit settlement, and of an implemented settlement. If a peace process has reached one of these stages, it is either possible that it moves on to the next lower stage or that the de-escalation process is once more interrupted by further incidents of escalation.

18 There are different versions of the contingency model. This version is based on the one in Bercovitch and Houston 1996, p. 15. However, the additional aspect of "other external influences" is derived from the version in Bercovitch and Wells 1993, p. 14.

Figure 3 **The contingency model**



The *antecedent conditions*, i.e. the conditions *before* the mediation process, include the nature of the conflict, of the involved parties and of the mediator. These conditions influence the process (*current conditions*) of mediation; they have an impact on the behaviour and the applied strategies of the mediators. Together the antecedent and current conditions determine the outcome of the mediation process (*consequent conditions*). The outcome consists of an objective and a subjective dimension, which means that the mediation process can lead to a change both on the structure-level and on the agent-level of the conflict.

In the original project upon which this article is based, the three theoretical conditions of the contingency model were introduced in detail. Analytical problems in relation to each dimension were exposed and discussed. However, due to the much shorter nature of this article and the emphasis on the empirical findings of the original study, a general discussion of each dimension is not possible at this point. Instead, the findings will be briefly introduced as part of the following case study in which the dimensions are applied to the case of Northern Ireland. In the case of further interest in the theoretical background, it is recommended to consult Bercovitch's literature on which the original discussion was based (e.g. Bercovitch 1992; 1995).

3 The Case of Northern Ireland – a Study of the Influence of International Mediators before, during and after the Negotiations to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998

First, it seems relevant to determine why the efforts of the ten years prior to July 2004 could be regarded as different to previous attempts at resolving the Northern Ireland conflict. Whereas previous attempts mainly involved the British government (apart from the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 which was achieved in collaboration with the Irish government), throughout the peace process from 1993 to 2004 it seemed to be *external* input in particular which made the difference; by external input, we refer to *international* intermediaries, who do not seem to have a direct vested interest in the conflict (see Bew and Gillespie 1999 and CAIN-database for detailed chronology of the peace process). The new efforts of the mid-90s only really showed promising results as the international interest – mainly American – increased and thereby induced the dynamic which consequently led to the Good Friday Agreement. In 1999, as the difficulties in implementing the Agreement started to show, a new revision process began in which the former US Senator George Mitchell once more took over the chairmanship, which mirrored his prior involvement in the “multi-party talks”. The problems during implementation still did not decrease after 1999, and active intervention by international mediators was not observable in the same manner any longer. Even though the decommissioning process was being monitored by the International Commission on Decommissioning (ICCD) under the chairmanship of General John de Chastelain and three IRA weapons inspections by international actors took place, the final initiative for mediation efforts lay with the British and Irish governments which actually both hold a problematic position in the conflict, as both intermediaries as well as involved parties.

Taking account of the developments after 1998 and also of the current situation, it could be assumed that international intermediaries have indeed succeeded in reaching a temporary structural and perceptual change of the conflict situation (by successfully negotiating the GFA). However, the ambiguous nature of the Agreement and the consequent problems in interpreting and implementing it have once again led to opposing perceptions and serious setbacks in the Northern Irish integration process (see Ruane et al. 2003, p. 123-134). Another escalation of the conflict has thereby only been delayed – the perceived interests of the actors seem to have started to move apart again. The upcoming analysis of the speeches and statements of the relevant actors, will attempt to test this hypothesis.

With regard to the theoretical foundation of this study, it remains to be said that even though Bercovitch developed his contingency model originally for analyses of mediation efforts in the area of international politics, his methodology can be used in the case of an intra-national conflict such as in Northern Ireland, where context, process and outcome also need to be taken into account. The focus on international influence in the peace process also justifies the use of Bercovitch's approach, since an international dimension is present.

Apart from that, the neorealistic assumption of an anarchic self-help system adopted both by Link (1988) and Bercovitch (1992) can equally be applied to the situation in Northern Ireland, in which actors strive for power and security in order to secure their identity. The question of the state's legitimacy and therefore of a recognised central authority which could remove the state of "anarchy" is at the very heart of the debate.

3.1 Antecedent Conditions – the Context

The following theoretical assumptions on the case of Northern Ireland are primarily based on the work of the scholars Jennifer Todd and Joseph Ruane (1996; 1999; Ruane 1999; Ruane et al. 2003), who analysed the origins and the dynamics of the Northern Ireland conflict and developed a model capturing its complex nature. The

model has been developed specifically to explain the case of Northern Ireland, but its constituent parts can be combined with Link's theory of conflict; therefore, by using Todd and Ruane's theory, the origin of the parties' opposing interests can be explained in detail. The authors' analytical concept of the "system of relationships" consists of three levels:

[F]irst, a set of overlapping cultural and ideological oppositions within Ireland based on religion (Catholic vs Protestant), ethnic origin (...), settler-native status and a set of antagonistic cultural stereotypes (...); second, a structure of dominance, dependence and inequality in which the British state controlled Ireland through the Protestant minority (...); third, a tendency toward communal polarisation in Ireland around the differences of religion, ethnicity and culture. (Ruane in Ruane and Todd 1999, p. 148)

The three levels of the "system of relationships" are intertwined and it becomes evident that the conflict parties are determined by more than one variable at a time. "[E]ven where one dimension was temporarily dominant, the others remained in existence, each reproduced and partially shaped by its interaction with the others" (Ruane and Todd 1996, p. 11). It could be assumed that the aspects which define the system of relationships can be found on the subjective as well as on the objective level of the conflict, because, on the one hand, differences in power between the parties can be detected; on the other hand, the three levels can have an impact on the perceptions and therefore also the perceived interests of the parties. The parties' interests therefore emerged according to this three-fold dynamic, and the task for international mediators is to find a compromise of interests, which could lead to a more integrative-cooperative phase of the conflict on the escalation scale.

Having introduced the underlying origins of the conflict, now the parties, the nature of the conflict and the involved mediators will be briefly introduced.

Nature of the Parties

The following table (Table 2) identifies the main political parties in Northern Ireland, their affiliations and main objectives¹⁹:

Table 2 The main internal political conflict parties in Northern Ireland

Denomination	Catholic		Protestant	
Orientation	Nationalist	Republican	Unionist	Unionist
Closest national affiliation	ROI		GB	
Party	SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party)	Sinn Fein	UUP (Ulster Unionist Party)	DUP (Democratic Unionist Party)
Nature of Party	moderate	Extreme	moderate	extreme
Main Objective	reunification of NI with ROI as long-term goal; consociation as compromise; "constitutional nationalism"	reunification of NI with ROI; formerly "armed struggle", now more integrative strategy	rejection of reunification of NI with the ROI / NI should remain part of GB	rejection of reunification of NI with the ROI / NI should remain part of GB

These parties exist in a particular political context which has changed a lot over the years. The achievement of the Agreement in 1998 had important implications, because it can be seen as an attempt to change the political context on a long-term basis, but the problems during implementation show that this change is not yet permanent.

The power relationship between the parties is very closely connected to the political context. The parties are in competition over power and resources, which determines their leverage in the political context they exist in.

Furthermore, when looking at the nature of the parties as part of the context of the mediation process, one has to take into account the previous relationship of the parties, i.e. the overall dynamic of the relationship and the patterns of escalation.

However, these last points are very closely related to the next context factor, the nature of the conflict, which obviously has a very strong impact on the parties' relationship and the development of their political context, and will therefore be discussed further in the next paragraphs.

Nature of the Conflict

According to Bercovitch two aspects are of crucial importance when analysing the nature of a conflict in detail. Firstly, one has to take a closer look at the contentious issues which seem dominant throughout the confrontations, because these issues mirror the essence of the underlying conflict; they point to the opposing tendencies and interests of the parties, and the nature of these issues can have a crucial impact on the chances of international mediators (Bercovitch and Houston 1996, p. 24). However, in terms of the preferred topics, each party can be on different escalation stages throughout the mediation process. Here we refer to the escalation stages I-IV (integration, polarisation, segregation / regression and destruction) identified above. In the following table (Table 3), a specific classification of topics for the four main parties will be presented, in accordance with these escalation stages:

19 The parties mentioned here are not the only parties in Northern Ireland's political arena, but for analytical reasons only the four most significant parties were included in the study. Other parties were the loyalist PUP (Progressive Unionist Party) or the APNI (Alliance Party Northern Ireland).

Table 3 **The dominant interests of the most important internal political conflict parties of Northern Ireland**

		Decoded interests / contentious issues			
	<i>perception of interests</i>	UUP	DUP	SDLP	SF
I	integration; access to political institutions	establishment of power-sharing executive, but dominance over institutional power; peace	from 2003: take-over of institutional power; renegotiation of GFA; establishment of new institutions	establishment of power-sharing executive and thereby access to institutional and structural power (long-term goal: revolution)	access to institutional power; establishment of power-sharing executive or rather implementation of GFA as interim phase (strategic goal: revolution)
II	integration or "status quo"	implementation of GFA; securing of their own position; improving the economic situation in Northern Ireland	securing of their own position; no unnecessary concessions to Catholics; later on: readiness to enter talks	implementation of GFA; equality agenda; self-determination; reform of police service and justice system; increase in structural and institutional power; security (decommissioning of paramilitary weapons)	implementation of GFA; reform of police service and justice system; increase in resources; change
III	"basic needs"; securing structural resources	idea of the union; maintaining the dominant power status; security / decommissioning of paramilitary weapons ("stand-in issue")	idea of the union; maintaining the status quo and dominant power status; security / decommissioning of paramilitary weapons ("stand-in issue")	increase in structural power (material, economic and cultural resources); strengthening of group	increase in material, economic and cultural resources (structural power); equality agenda; self-determination; demilitarisation (therefore also: decommissioning as "stand-in issue"); release of paramilitary prisoners; strengthening of group
IV	realisation of ultimate goal	"isolation"; i.e. maintaining of the union without further integration despite lack of agreement from other groups	"isolation"; union realised on a long-term basis without the possibility of change	reunification with the Republic of Ireland – revolution as long-term goal	reunification with the Republic of Ireland ("armed struggle"); revolution

It is important to consider that even though the dominant topics mirror the perceived interests of the parties, it can be possible that topics take over a symbolic

function, or rather that they act as stand-in issues (i.e. the topic of decommissioning). Such issues tend to perpetuate the underlying conflict. This means that a party's opinion on that particular topic represents the underlying attitude of this party towards the other parties involved. This aspect makes an empirical analysis of speeches very difficult, because it is not always possible to decode the "real" intentions of the parties.

On the other hand, if contentious issues can be resolved or if a compromise can be reached, this has a direct positive impact on the conflict. This can be fostered by international mediators and, if realised, this can again have important implications for further international mediation efforts.

The second important factor when analysing the nature of a conflict is the question of timing and ripeness, which is determined by the escalation stage of the conflict. Authors like Bercovitch and Kriesberg are of the opinion that the success or failure of mediation depends on the timing of the efforts.²⁰ According to Zartman, the efforts could be most promising when a so-called "mutually hurting stalemate" develops which can evolve (1) if there has been a substantial degree of escalation or this will happen in the near future, (2) if the negotiation efforts of the parties have resulted in an impasse, (3) if the conflict parties cannot push through their interests unilaterally anymore and therefore a joint solution appears more attractive, (4) if the existing power relationship is changing and the previously weaker party becomes stronger.²¹ If such a situation arises, the conflict is ripe for international efforts.

Such a mutually hurting stalemate can also evolve on the level of the perceived interests, but the question is whether international mediators can remove such a stalemate as well or whether they are only capable of bringing about *structural* changes. A renewed escalation on the level of perceptions could lead to another escalation on the objective level and thereby actually increase the intensity

20 On timing of escalation efforts see Kriesberg 1991.

21 On the concept of the "mutually hurting stalemate" according to Zartman see Zartman 1997, p. 3-19.

of the conflict once more. This could then lead to a second, worse escalation on the subjective level of conflict, to an “escalation of perceptions”. As was mentioned earlier on, this seems to be the danger in the Northern Irish peace process where the de-escalation process is continuously interrupted by further incidents of escalation, both in terms of the parties’ perceptions and in terms of paramilitary acts of violence. This makes the mediation process much more complicated, since it continuously destroys the fragile level of trust which the conflict parties had just developed, often with the help of international intermediaries. As one example, one could mention the “Real IRA” attack on Omagh just after the achievement of the GFA. Even though a settlement had been negotiated and most of the parties seemed very enthusiastic, the process was in danger of collapsing once again, in this case due to paramilitary violence parallel to the peace efforts. Of course, events like these have a strong impact on the parties’ perceptions, but in this case the importance of the Agreement and the efforts of international actors seemed to rescue the situation.

Nature of the Mediator

Bercovitch suggests that a number of various potential international mediators exist with different degrees of influence. The following table is based on Bercovitch’s characterisation of each potential mediator type (see Bercovitch 1992, p. 10-13):

Table 4 Types of international mediators and their characteristics

Type	Individuals		States	Institutions & Organisations
Subtypes	Informal	Formal	-	-
Profile	individual with no official position; mediation based on personal experience rather than external influence	political representative in his/her "individual capacity" in order to mediate a conflict between official representatives of other states or groups in a formal environment; hybrid variant combining the role with individual characteristics	usually represented by one of their most important decision-makers; international attention is focused on this representative because his/her actions represent the state's attitude towards the conflict and the parties	institutions can be either regional or international; transnational organisations are groups of individuals with the same interest base; a great number of potential mediators with different power status and different degrees of flexibility
Advantages	high degree of flexibility	access to important decision-makers; formal environment, procedures and rules enforce certain behaviour on the parties; relatively high degree of flexibility	quick access to important resources; "carrots and sticks"	diverse members with different types of backgrounds and different types of expertise; due to the international or transnational nature the organisation or institution can seem more neutral
Disadvantages	less access to resources and important decision-makers; lack of formal environment can lead to ignorance of rules of the game	not as much influence as an official political representative	position within state can either open up possibilities or function as an obstacle because the official is bound by the position; distinction between small and big states (power status is crucial)	less direct access to state resources and capabilities; international or transnational nature can make decision-making more difficult

However, Bercovitch's categories are only guidelines to identify the nature of the mediator in a particular conflict situation; in reality, these differences are often not as clear-cut.

One of the main aspects when discussing the nature of a mediator is how neutral a potential mediator should be. Whereas authors like Oran Young (1967, p. 81) postulate that the mediator's impartiality is crucial, Bercovitch and Houston, for instance, see the whole mediation process as one of exchange and influence between the mediator and the conflict parties (1996, p. 26). According to these scholars it is mainly the mediator's influence which makes the conflict parties comply and which can create higher levels of flexibility and trust on all sides due to the leverage involved. This seems to be a very important factor when looking at US influence in Northern Ireland.

Before identifying the different international mediators involved in the Northern Irish peace process in detail, one could raise the question of how and why international interest evolved over the years. First, international attention increased since 1968/69, when the "Troubles" began, especially due to the civil rights movement and the increase in paramilitary violence. The most significant event was probably the Republican hunger strike of 1981. But active international intervention was still almost impossible then, because the conflict was still regarded as an internal matter of the United Kingdom.

A number of developments changed the situation, however, including the fact that in 1973 both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland joined the European Community, which put the two countries into a more multinational arena.

Secondly, the "American Connection" (see Holland 1989), which was established by Irish immigrants in the USA, began to exert strong influence on the American government. This connection was primarily utilised by Northern Irish Republicans and their organisations in the USA (such as NORAIID or the INC) in order to spread a positive image of Republican ideology throughout the USA.

Representatives of the more moderate "constitutional nationalism", like John Hume, also made excessive use of the "American Connection", in order to win the US government over to support a peaceful solution of the conflict.

In general, American dominance among international actors interested in regulating the Northern Ireland conflict seems evident, since the most effective initiatives originated in the USA. As a reason why no other state intervened, one could mention the fact that only the British and Irish governments have a direct interest in the regulation of the conflict. But why exactly did the conflict become a legitimate concern of American foreign policy?

As mentioned above, there are two main strands of Irish-American influence, Irish Republicanism and moderate Irish Nationalism. Hume, a constitutional nationalist, built very good connections with the “Four Horsemen” Edward Kennedy, Hugh Carey, Tip O’Neill and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (see Thompson 2001, p. 75). President Carter reacted to their influence and defined Northern Ireland a legitimate interest of American foreign policy for the first time; however, this was only an oral statement.

In opposition to this, Reagan put more emphasis on the special relationship between the USA and Britain, but he did confront the former British Prime Minister Thatcher on Northern Ireland, which could be regarded as a break with the previous American policy of non-interference (see *ibid.*, p. 124). Especially since then, the Irish-American lobby became very important during presidential elections.

George Bush did not put a strong emphasis on Northern Ireland, but his constructive initiatives to improve the Irish-American relationship did prepare the stage for Clinton, who built close ties with Irish-American lobbyists during his election campaign in 1992 by ensuring them increased support for a peaceful solution if elected US President.²² Clinton’s interest was mainly based on the idealist strand of his foreign policy strategy which promoted the spread of peace and democracy in the world and, additionally, on his personal interest. On the whole, Clinton’s presidency induced an important change of strategy towards Northern Ireland, since America now became more *actively* involved. America’s strategy

22 On George Bush’s policy towards Northern Ireland see Thompson 2001, p. 151.

under Clinton, was executed primarily by the president himself and former US Senator George Mitchell. Mitchell was originally appointed as economic adviser to Clinton and then became one of the three independent chairmen during the negotiations leading up to the GFA.

George W. Bush changed the approach towards Northern Ireland again, mainly by putting much more pressure on paramilitary activists. His strategy will be discussed further in the upcoming chapter on the mediators' strategies.

During their times in office the US Presidents were supported by envoys, such as George Mitchell, Richard Haass and Mitchell Reiss, who were in close contact with the US government. The independent chairmen Mitchell, Holkeri and de Chastelain played a key role during the negotiations, but were, in this function, more detached from their countries of origin. Other international actors included the weapons inspectors from Finland and South Africa.²³

It remains to be said at this point, that an intermediary can take over different functions in the course of the mediation process or change his or her strategy. Especially in the case of Mitchell this becomes evident, since he took over different functions between 1995 and 1999 after which he retired from the process altogether.

3.2 Current Conditions – Applied Mediation Strategies and Behaviour of the International Mediators in Northern Ireland

After outlining the historical development of the mainly American-dominated interest in a regulation of the Northern Ireland conflict, at this point the applied strategies and the behaviour of the international mediators will be examined in detail. In order to expose these strategies, an analysis of the existing speeches and statements of the involved international actors has been conducted by using the

CAQDAS-program “maxqda”; the documents include the speeches and statements of the actors Clinton, Bush, Mitchell and Haass. Like the documents which will be used in the later analysis of the conflict parties’ perceived interests, most of these documents were taken from the CAIN-database.²⁴ Other documents, which were not included in CAIN, were taken from the Internet and have been added to this collection, because they seemed essential for the strategy analysis.²⁵

According to the model of international mediation strategies developed by Touval and Zartman, there are three main strategies: (1) *communication-facilitation strategies*, (2) *formulation strategies*, and (3) *manipulation strategies*. Under each of these three main strategies fall a number of subordinate strategies which represent the various tactics a mediator can use throughout the mediation process, e.g. make contact with the parties or clarify the situation when using communication-facilitation strategies. When applying formulation strategies, the mediator may, on the one hand, control the pace and formality of the meetings, structure the agenda or help parties save face. On the other hand, a manipulative strategy would require becoming even more actively involved as a mediator, by, for instance, taking responsibility for concessions, making substantive suggestions or by promising or withdrawing resources (see Table 5 for a full listing of possible substrategies).

23 For a full listing of the mediators’ identity consult the strategy table included in the Appendix at the end of this article.

24 The database can be found on the Internet at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/> (date last viewed: 29.01.2006).

25 See Appendix for references to the relevant websites.

Table 5 **Touval and Zartman's three-fold classification of mediation strategies²⁶**

<p>1) Communication-facilitation strategies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - make contact with parties - gain the trust and confidence of the parties - arrange for interactions between the parties - identify issues and interests - clarify situation - avoid taking sides - develop a rapport with parties - supply missing information - develop a framework for understanding - encourage meaningful communication - offer positive evaluations - allow the interests of all parties to be discussed
<p>2) Formulation strategies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - choose meetings site - control pace and formality of meetings - control physical environment - establish protocol - suggest procedures - highlight common interests - reduce tensions - control timing - deal with simple issues first - structure agenda - keep parties at the table - help parties save face - keep process focused on issues
<p>3) Manipulation strategies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - change parties' expectations - take responsibility for concessions - make substantive suggestions and proposals - make parties aware of costs of non-agreement - supply and filter information - suggest concessions parties can make - help negotiators to undo a commitment - reward party concessions - help devise a framework for acceptable outcome - change expectations - press the parties to show flexibility - promise resources or threaten withdrawal - offer to verify compliance with agreement

²⁶ Taken from Bercovitch 1992, p. 17-18.

The existing documents in our case study were screened for passages which would imply these three strategies or, rather, the substrategies belonging to them. These text passages were collected in “maxqda” under the labels “Zartman 1”, “Zartman 2” and “Zartman 3” and then evaluated. The three values which were found for each date on which a document was released, have been inserted into the following formula, in order to reach an overall value for each document:

formula:
$$Z^S = \frac{z_1 + 2z_2 + 3z_3}{(z_1 + z_2 + z_3)}$$

example: if $z_1 = 11$; $z_2 = 3$ and $z_3 = 0$, then

$$Z^S = \frac{11 + 2 \cdot 3 + 3 \cdot 0}{(11 + 2 + 0)} = \frac{17}{13} = Z^S = 1,21$$

The weighting of the mediation strategies can be justified by taking into account the fact that more intensive mediation strategies require a higher multiplier in order to get a value between 1 and 3.

Those events of international involvement for which no statements or speeches could be found, but which seemed to be of high importance for a thorough analysis of the mediators' strategies, were evaluated with the help of the existing literature, and, according to that, they were assigned a value between 1 and 3 on the Touval and Zartman-scale of mediation strategies. In these cases, the particular nature of the event and the substrategies it represents were decided upon and also included in the overall strategy table. The main literature consulted includes the works of Thompson (2001) Hausdewell/Brown (2002) and Ruane/Todd (1996; 1999; 2003). Both evaluations were then combined, included in a table and visualised graphically (see Figure 7) to clarify the development of the different strands of international mediation activity in Northern Ireland during the period from 1994 until 2004 (see Appendix at the end of this paper for the full table of mediation strategies used).

It remains to be said that this combination of the evaluation of the existing documents and the information taken from relevant academic literature can only show a trend in the development. In addition to that, it could be questioned whether speeches and statements can be weighted in the same way as, for example, official visits or other active interventions. Moreover, it needs to be noted that speeches can be addressed towards a variety of groups and have different purposes. However, speeches are also strategic means like other more active interventions, and, if an actor mentions or implies a manipulative strategy, this can be interpreted as representing this actor's overall strategy in relation to the conflict at a particular point in time. On the whole, the strategies have to be viewed in the context of the development of the events, the rank of the actor involved and his identity.

So which strategies were used throughout the peace process in Northern Ireland? At this point, we will provide an interpretation of the empirical strategy analysis and create a strategy profile for the relevant international actors. The first profile will deal with former US President Clinton and his administration – it has previously been mentioned that Clinton started to show great personal interest in the developments in Northern Ireland from very early on. This culminated in 1994 when Clinton granted Sinn Féin-president Gerry Adams a 48-hour visa, thereby allowing him to travel to the United States in order to participate in a session of the “National Committee on American Foreign Policy Forum” (see Thompson 2001, p. 175). Due to the important preparation in the years preceding that particular incident a “ripe moment” had been created and then actively utilised by Clinton in 1994. Further possibilities for action emerged after the IRA called a ceasefire in return for the visa. For instance, in October 1994 Clinton granted Adams a second US-visa, this time for a slightly longer period of time. In November 1994 Clinton published an important statement about new initiatives in relation to the Northern Irish peace process (ibid. 2001, p. 188), after which he appointed Senator George Mitchell as his economic adviser on Ireland and Northern Ireland. It should be noted that at that point Mitchell did not serve as a “peace envoy” yet, but Clinton's

strategy was already a significant step towards more active involvement in Northern Ireland. Because of this appointment and an invitation to the Sinn Féin president to attend the St. Patrick's Day celebrations at the White House the relations between the United States and Great Britain were temporarily very tense.

The announcement of Clinton's first official visit to Northern Ireland in November 1995 – which was also the very first visit of a US President to the region – led to the so-called "Twin Track Initiative"²⁷ which was introduced by the British and Irish governments in order to deal with the problem of paramilitary decommissioning separately from the actual peace negotiations. The International Body on Decommissioning (IBD) was chaired by George Mitchell who was formally invited by both the British and Irish governments, after having been personally selected by Clinton. The IBD published the so-called "Mitchell-Report", which defined, for instance, the renouncement of violent methods as a precondition for joining substantial talks. This precondition was part of the so-called "Mitchell Principles".

Therefore, before the formalised negotiations even began, Clinton used a combination of *communication-facilitation strategies* and *manipulative strategies*, which provided positive input at the right moments. The president's visit was supposed to mainly confirm his foreign policy approach, because at that point he was just about to embark on important negotiations with Bosnian political leaders (see Thompson 2001, p. 181). In addition to that, the author Thompson postulates that Clinton's first official visit had changed the conflict parties' perceptions (see *ibid.* p. 182). In any case, one may argue that this visit changed the degree to which the parties were willing to react to new initiatives, but how much the parties' perceptions really changed will be examined at a later point in this study. However, a crucial aspect in relation to Clinton's strategy is the fact that he regarded it as being of great

27 See Arthur 1997 for further information on the "Twin Track" initiative and an overview of American influence in the Northern Ireland peace process.

importance that he also welcomed unionist representatives into the White House in order to appear impartial.

There was no policy commitment of establishing a united Ireland or confirming a partitioned Ireland. American foreign policy toward Northern Ireland sought to facilitate a peace process, the outcome of the process was irrelevant. The American government did not care about solving the Northern Ireland problem. (...) Until the end of the Clinton administration, the United States refused to support any group over another in the peace process. (Thompson 2001, p. 183)

Even if the government did not want to contribute to a one-sided solution, it becomes evident that the aim was a regulation of the conflict towards a lower stage on the escalation scale. Interventions like this alone could have already changed the interests of the internal conflict parties on a long-term basis, but the question is whether this has actually happened in Northern Ireland.

The appointment of Mitchell as “economic adviser” took place about one year before the next upcoming presidential election and as a consequence Clinton once more gained support from the Irish-American electorate; in spite of this, the strategy also brought with it risks, e.g. a potential foreign policy failure (see Thompson 2001, p. 182).

During this time the strategies used by Mitchell could be classified as belonging to the first category of Touval and Zartman’s three-fold model, the *communication-facilitation strategies*. Mitchell acted as economic adviser for the regions of Ireland and Northern Ireland and later served as chairman of the International Body on Decommissioning. Both positions required mainly supportive and advisory strategies, but the different nature of these positions should be taken into account. Whereas the former position was carried out as an official representative of the USA, in the latter case Mitchell acted as an individual, but in a formal environment and with very close ties to the US government; therefore, his

position in the IBD and later as independent chairman could be seen as a “hybrid” mediator type where the actor can be located between his role as individual and his role as official representative.

After the British government had prematurely rejected the IBD report, US President Clinton again used supportive strategic measures, because it was not his intention to impose a solution on the two governments and thereby let the USA become the dominant force in the Northern Irish peace process (see *ibid.* 2001, p. 183).

However, despite the rejection of the IBD report, George Mitchell recommended, in 1996, that the peace negotiations should be taken up as soon as possible, due to the fact that Republican willingness began to dwindle as a consequence of the negative British attitude; this was confirmed by the breach of the IRA-ceasefire on February 9th 1996. After the start of the negotiations on July 10th 1996, Clinton preferred to remain more in the background instead of being an active intervening actor, because he now had to focus on his re-election as US President. Despite this, he did express his support for Mitchell as independent chairman during the talks. Clinton therefore once more followed *communication-facilitation strategies* according to Touval and Zartman.²⁸

Subsequent to his re-election Clinton had to face severe problems: the impeachment processes and domestic policy issues seemed to push foreign policy questions into the background. But, even during Clinton’s second administration Irish-American lobbyists made attempts to influence the US government towards a more active approach.

At this time in Great Britain a significant change took place after the Labour Party achieved a landslide victory with Tony Blair as future prime minister. Already very shortly after the election Blair began to provide new positive impulses for the peace process, and he also increased co-operation with the United States. The “Twin

28 On Clinton’s rather passive role during his second election campaign see Thompson 2001, p. 185-186.

Track Initiative”, which had previously been developed by the International Body on Decommissioning under Mitchell’s chairmanship, was now going to be completely realised, due to a proposition to found another commission in order to deal with the problem of decommissioning separately from the GFA talks. Clinton supported these efforts with an important statement welcoming the renewal of the IRA-ceasefire.

Following the intense support by Clinton and his administration for Mitchell during the remaining negotiation process and another official visit of the US President in 1998, foreign policy issues became very important again. During the negotiation process Mitchell was repeatedly forced to change his strategies in co-operation with his colleagues de Chastelain and Holkeri and also with the Irish and British governments in order to react and adapt to the developments of the peace process. Whereas throughout the first phase of the negotiations they primarily employed *communication-facilitation strategies* and later also *formulation strategies*, this changed at a later point in time. Mitchell’s most important strategic decision throughout the peace negotiations was to bring the deadline for agreement forward to April 9th 1998 (see Mitchell 1999, p. 143).²⁹ This was supposed to create a new dynamic during the negotiations which, in fact, consequently led to the signing of the Agreement. In addition to this, throughout the last days of the talks Mitchell presented a potential version of the final document to the internal conflict parties of Northern Ireland, whereby he actively used *manipulation strategies*. It already becomes evident at this point that Mitchell seemed to be the most flexible actor throughout the peace process.

After the problems during the implementation process had manifested themselves, Mitchell once again took over the role of independent chairman in the revision process, which began on September 6th 1999. In this period Mitchell

29 In addition to this, see Mitchell 2002 for another account of Mitchell’s experience and his important strategic decisions as international mediator involved in Northern Ireland.

followed a rather weak strategy of *communication and facilitation*, because the problematic aspects of decommissioning and the creation of the new power-sharing institutions were not supposed to be subject to renewed negotiations, but should simply be clarified. The revision process was finally brought to an end with an agreement, but in the year 2000 the new deadlines for decommissioning were ignored once more and the new institutions were suspended only shortly after their creation. After this Mitchell withdrew as international mediator from Northern Ireland and he did not take over this role again. However, he later still showed great personal interest in the progress of the peace process, but he felt very discouraged by the developments and the suspension of the institutions (see Mitchell 1999, p. 211 and Mitchell 2002).


In May 2000, for the first time an act of paramilitary decommissioning by the IRA could be observed, and it was verified by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) which had built intensive contacts with paramilitary groups since 1999. All the activities of the commission can be summed up under *formulation strategies*, because the commission made proposals in relation to the procedures and it controlled the timing. Clinton welcomed these developments with a statement, but again he was intensely focused on the upcoming elections and on important domestic policy issues. On December 12th and 13th 2000, Clinton undertook his last official visit to Northern Ireland as president of the United States, and in his speech he once again addressed the parties to the conflict and expressed his great personal interest in a peaceful regulation of the conflict. Moreover, he strongly appealed to Gerry Adams to finally resolve the problem of decommissioning, which can be evaluated as a *manipulative strategy*, the third stage of Touval and Zartman's model.

The following year Clinton was replaced by the current US President George W. Bush. When reviewing Bush's administrative period until mid-2004, it seems, at first sight, as if Bush did not regard the topic of Northern Ireland as being one of significant priority. This is not necessarily correct. Like Clinton, Bush continues the

annual St. Patrick's Day celebrations in Washington. He made his first official joint statement with the Irish Taoiseach (prime minister) Ahern on February 16th 2001, in which he expressed his support for the peace process. Bush's envoy Richard Haass was on an official visit in Northern Ireland in order to hold talks with the conflict parties, when the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 created an emergency situation in America. Even though the Bush administration had already embarked on a more extreme course in relation to the fight of international terrorism before the attacks on America, this event now also changed the administration's approach towards the Northern Irish peace process. Bush and his envoy Haass began to put more intense pressure on the conflict parties – especially on Northern Irish Republicans – in order to push forward the process of paramilitary decommissioning (*manipulative strategy*). This time there were not only appeals but also verbal manipulations, since the parties were threatened with negative sanctions. As an example of such a manipulative approach one could mention Haass' statement from May 11th 2002, in which he promised negative consequences if it turned out that connections existed between Northern Irish Republican groups and Columbian FARC-rebels. Mitchell Reiss, Haass' successor travelled to Northern Ireland in 2004 in order to re-evaluate the internal conflict parties' attitudes once more and to engage them in a dialogue in order to solve the problem of decommissioning as well as to speed up the reform of the police service.

In the following graph the different mediation strategies employed by the various international mediators involved have been visualised. This graph shows in which period certain mediators were most active:

Figure 4 The strategies employed by the various international mediators from 1994 to mid-2004³⁰



It remains to be said that since this study was conducted there have been a number of new developments. After several failed attempts by the IICD to bring about a substantial and transparent enough act of decommissioning, an important IRA-statement was released in which the organisation asked its members to lay down their arms and to pursue their goals through exclusively political channels. This also led to the alleged complete decommissioning of IRA arms, which had been witnessed by members of the Protestant and the Catholic Church as a trust-building measure. Since these events a number of important initiatives have been employed which were welcomed by the US government. “Talks about talks” on the re-opening of the institutions have begun once more.

³⁰ The reason why the graphs representing the mediation strategies start at 0 in this case is that it was intended to visualise more clearly *when* communication-facilitation strategies were used (value 1). Only the very top of the marked areas represents an actual strategy value. The highlighted areas are simply a visualisation, which will make it easier later on to distinguish between the conflict parties’ escalation values and the international mediator’s strategies in the combined graph (Figure 7).

3.3 Consequent Conditions – A Qualitative Analysis of the Outcome of the Mediation Process with Emphasis on Changes in the Conflict Parties’ Perceptions – “De-escalation of Minds”?

In the following part of this study the *effects* of the international mediation efforts on the perception of interests by the most important political conflict parties in Northern Ireland will be analysed. First of all, however, a short overview of the results affecting the objective dimension of the conflict will be presented. After that the emphasis will be put on the subjective dimension of the mediation outcome, here the changes in the perceived interests of the conflict parties. The results will then be combined with the previous strategy analysis and interpreted.

3.3.1 Objective Criteria – Reduced Escalation Behaviour and the Future of the Good Friday Agreement

As has been mentioned before, the international mediation process in Northern Ireland provided new positive input. In particular, Clinton’s early initiatives in 1994 and his three official visits seemed to push forward the peace negotiations. The importance of American support in achieving the Agreement seems evident, but if the peace process as a whole is being reviewed from a contemporary perspective one might doubt the success of the international efforts up to that point. At the time of the original study on which this article is based, the Agreement had to go through another revision process, in which international influence seemed to be of a very modest and weak nature in comparison to earlier efforts. Add to this, it was not clear whether the Agreement would survive this second revision process at all. It was in danger of being declared invalid. Indeed, there had been important progress with regard to implementation and to political and social integration, but this seemed almost marginal when evaluated in mid-2004, when a renewed “mutually hurting stalemate” had developed.

As a second aspect one could mention the level of violence. Even though the most important paramilitary groups had built closer contacts with the IICD after the signing of the GFA, substantial acts of decommissioning which satisfied both communities had not been achieved at that point. The acts which had taken place were quickly doubted due to a lack of transparency.

Another development in relation to the question of violence is a change in the type of dominant paramilitary activities. It turns out that in the years after 1998 Loyalist, therefore Protestant, violent attacks were more numerous than Republican attacks, especially due to the fact that serious intra-Loyalist feuds had intensified. For the first time in the history of the "Troubles" the number of victims who were killed by Loyalists was higher than the number of victims killed in Republican acts of violence.

On the whole, it becomes evident, that structural changes in Northern Ireland had been fostered by the intervention of international actors or mediators, but they have not remained stable. Another relapse on the structural level has taken place and this could be explained by the fact that the mediation process might not have led to a long-term change of the conflict parties' perceived interests.

3.3.2 Subjective Criteria – a CAQDAS-study of the Perceived Interests of the Involved Internal Conflict Parties of Northern Ireland – Have the Goals of the Mediation Process been Achieved?

3.3.2.1 The Methodology

In the following main part of this empirical study of the opposing interests as perceived by the internal conflict parties, a qualitative method of inquiry will be used which will be complemented by aspects of quantitative data evaluation and visualisation. This analysis is a case study of the Northern Ireland conflict which is supposed to test whether international mediation efforts have made a difference on the level of perception, here of the perceived interests, and whether or not these efforts have led to a success. Success is here understood as a substantial degree of de-escalation.

In their work "Designing Social Inquiry" (1994, p. 52) the authors King, Keohane and Verba point out that the term "case" can be either used in relation to a unit within a study or in relation to the "case as a whole", i.e. the international mediation efforts "in the case of" Northern Ireland. The researcher wants to understand this particular case better, but the case cannot be seen as representative of other cases. On the whole, it is crucial that such a case study would enable the researcher to reach results which are valid and reliable. However, the three authors' assumptions mainly deal with comparative case studies, in which it is, for instance, possible to test negative cases. Bercovitch states that in opposition to this, when planning a single-case study, it seems necessary to collect data specific to this particular case, according to which the best method of analysis could be developed (Bercovitch 1992, p. 24). A qualitative method of data evaluation also implies that the researcher himself is part of the inquiry process, because with his evaluations and interpretations he represents a specific epistemological perspective and a particular socio-political context, which can both have an impact on the way in which the data is evaluated. This means that particular knowledge about the world can be acquired; but this knowledge can never be universal or final. In order to escape this insecurity, it is highly important to conduct a study according to rules which have been clearly decided on in advance.

As part of the following study the methodology of the analysis of approximately one hundred speeches and statements by representatives of the four most important Northern Irish parties will be presented. The documents have been taken from the so-called CAIN-database, which can be found at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/> on the Internet. During this sampling process the relevant textual material was identified, but it also became evident that a balanced selection of documents did not seem possible. The actors have not all given the same amount of speeches and have expressed their opinion in different degrees of intensity.

In order to analyse the development of the escalation of the perceived interests in detail, we used the four stages of the "perception of interests" which

have previously been identified as part of the modified escalation model. These four stages are part of the subjective dimension of a conflict and also contain important implications for the parties' perceptions in relation to the power relationship, the system of relationships and the outcome-expectations. However, in this analysis the emphasis was put on the perceived interests, because in Link's theory of conflict the level of the perceived interests is considered as the opposite of the structural level, i.e. the organisation of the relationship. Therefore, the four escalation stages can be identified as follows:

- I) Integration; access to political institutions
- II) Integration or "status quo"
- III) "Basic needs"; securing structural resources
- IV) Realisation of the ultimate goal

For each of these four stages, and for the four most important internal political conflict parties of Northern Ireland, a number of subordinate interests or contentious issues can be identified, which have been decoded earlier on. In order to find out on which stage on the escalation scale a particular party was at the time of a certain speech or statement, the documents were screened for these subordinate interests, which then were reassigned to the four main categories of perceived interests mirroring the escalation stages I to IV. Due to the large amount of data the analysis was conducted with the help of the CAQDAS-computer program "maxqda" which enables the researcher to do qualitative textual analyses.³¹ The program's clear interface makes it possible to use four screens at the same time: the list of the documents to be analysed, the list of the codes for the analysis, the text of

³¹ See Fielding and Lee 1998 on the possible dangers when conducting qualitative research with the help of computer-aided data analysis.

the particular document which is being analysed at that time and a screen containing the coded text passages.

It has become evident that the four main codes for the analysis have been predetermined by the four escalation stages mentioned above. This is a method which has actually been rejected in certain strands of the qualitative research tradition when analysing documents. However, since it was not the objective to look for “random” trends, but instead for the conflict parties’ interests throughout the development of the mediation process, this method seemed to be the most promising one. It remains to be said that some of the subordinate themes which have been decoded above were only added while conducting the analysis after they had reoccurred a few times. This method could be characterised as a broadened version of content analysis in the tradition of Miles and Huberman, who suggest a list of main codes which should serve as a starting point in the analysis. This implies that the subcategories can still be changed during the process of the analysis. The following table (Table 6) will present coding examples for the four parties:

Table 6 **Examples of “maxqda”-codings for escalation stages I-IV for each party**

<u>Examples for stage I of the escalation scale</u> The parties are on stage I of the escalation scale in relation to their interests when they address those topics which have been defined as this party’s representative topics for the stage of “Integration; Access to political institutions”	
UUP	In the case of the UUP this would be, for example, the establishment of a power-sharing executive but still dominance over institutional power. Example of a coding: “We want an Assembly where there is accountability to all the people of Northern Ireland and all of our people can, if they wish, participate meaningfully” (taken from a speech held by former UUP-leader David Trimble on March 23 rd 1996).
DUP	In the case of the DUP this would be, for example (from 2003 on) the establishment of new institutions or the renegotiation of the GFA. Example of a coding: “We are determined to continue to push for the creation of structures that are stable, free from terror and grounded on solid democratic principles” (taken from a speech of DUP-leader Ian Paisley on June 25 th 2004).
SDLP	In the case of the SDLP this would be establishment of a power-sharing executive and thereby access to institutional and structural power. Example of coding: “The principle [of power-sharing] is now well established, and only the most extreme and self-deluded believe it is possible to govern without inclusiveness. Only by incorporating everybody into the decision-making process can we build stable, democratic and legitimate institutions” (taken from a speech held by former SDLP-leader John Hume on Nov. 14 th 1998).
SF	In the case of SF this would be access to institutional power of the establishment of a

	power-sharing executive. Example of a coding: "But whatever else happens the British government must lift the suspension of the institutions and allow the process defined in the Agreement to take its course" (taken from a speech held by SF-president Gerry Adams on Jan. 15 th 2005).
Examples for stage II of the escalation scale The parties are on stage II of the escalation scale in relation to their interests when they address those topics which have been defined as this party's representative topics for the stage of "Integration or 'status quo'"	
UUP	In the case of the UUP this would be, for example, the implementation of the GFA or the securing of the party's own position. Example of a coding: "I say to those on both sides who are not serious about lasting agreement, the people of Northern Ireland are fed up with your rhetoric and your threats of going back to violence. The legacy of violence is human suffering, social and economic deprivation. Do you really want to see another generation go through the same all over again?" (taken from a speech held by former UUP-leader David Trimble on March 21 st 1998).
DUP	In the case of the DUP this would be securing their own position or no unnecessary concessions to Catholics. Example of a coding: "With the passing of each day more and more Unionists have come to realise that the analysis provided by the DUP is the only way to defend our traditional values and maintain our position within the United Kingdom. For the first time in many years Unionists are looking forward to the future with confidence" (taken from a speech held by DUP-leader Ian Paisley on June 25 th 2004).
SDLP	In the case of the SDLP this would be, for example, further implementation of the GFA or the equality agenda. Example of a coding: "While others show no end of political neck, the SDLP are the backbone of the Agreement. In its negotiation. In its implementation. In the development of its potential" (taken from a speech held by Mark Durkan from Nov 2 nd 2002).
SF	In the case of SF, this would be, for example, implementation of the GFA or the reform of the police and justice system. Example of a coding: "The focus for us must be to thwart the efforts to prevent the process of change. We must continue to build our political strength, and to defend the Good Friday Agreement" (taken from a speech held by SF-president Gerry Adams on Feb 8 th 2003).
Examples for stage III of the escalation scale The parties are on stage III of the escalation scale in relation to their interests when they address those topics which have been defined as this party's representative topics for the stage of "basic needs; securing of structural resources"	
UUP	In the case of the UUP this would be, for example, the idea of the Union or the securing of their dominant power status. Example of a coding: "Today, elsewhere in Armagh they are publishing a paper on building a united Ireland through something they call planned integration. Well they can plan all they like, but it can't happen without our consent, and we prefer to remain simply British" (taken from a speech held by the former UUP-leader David Trimble on Oct 18 th 2003).
DUP	In the case of the DUP this would be, for example, the idea of the Union, maintaining their status quo and their dominant power status or the issues of security and decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. Example of a coding: "IRA/Sinn Fein must learn that there is a price to be paid by them for a place at the table and until they get rid of the guns on the table, under the table and outside the doors of the negotiating chamber, they will have no place in the talks. They have a choice to make, and until they make it, the door of democracy is locked against them" (taken from a speech held by DUP-leader Ian Paisley on May 8 th 2004).
SDLP	In the case of the SDLP this would be, for example, an increase in structural power (material, economic and cultural resources) or a strengthening of the group. Example of a coding: "We know as well that Irish Nationalism cannot stand still and that in truth the very idea of 'northern nationalism' cannot be defined in isolation from the wider island-

	wide nationalism" (taken from a speech held by the current SDLP-leader Mark Durkan on April 26 th 2003).
SF	In the case of SF this would be, for instance, an increase in material, economic and cultural resources (structural power); the realisation of the equality agenda, of self-determination, or demilitarisation (therefore also: decommissioning as "stand-in issue"); also, strengthening of the group. Example of a coding: "Sinn Féin isn't prepared to sit back and allow the democratic rights and entitlements of nationalists living in the North to be filtered through a unionist prism. Equality is equality is equality" (taken from a speech held by SF-president Gerry Adams on Feb 27 th 2000).
Examples for stage IV of the escalation scale The parties are on stage IV of the escalation scale in relation to their interests when they address those topics which have been defined as this party's representative topics for the stage of "realisation of the ultimate goal"	
UUP	In the case of the UUP this would be "isolation"; i.e. maintaining of the union without further integration despite lack of agreement from other groups. But no codings were found.
DUP	In the case of the DUP this would be, for example, that the union would be realised on a long-term basis, without the possibility for change. Example of a coding: "In this our thirtieth year we meet at a time when Ulster's democratic freedoms have never been more under threat. This party has and continues to be the single greatest obstacle to thwarting the plan of Ulster's enemies to take us through the gates and into a United Ireland. That is why we, in the DUP have been vilified, harried and attacked over the past thirty years" (taken from a speech held by DUP-leader Ian Paisley on Nov 24 th 2001).
SDLP	In the case of the SDLP this would be the reunification with the Republic of Ireland – revolution as long-term goal. Example of coding: "As a Nationalist, I am 100% for a united Ireland, just as I am 100% for the Agreement. I believe unity can be attained. In unity I believe the Agreement can and must be sustained" (taken from a speech held by the current SDLP-leader Mark Durkan on April 26 th 2003).
SF	In the case of SF this would be a reunification with the Republic of Ireland ("armed struggle"), i.e. a revolution. Example of a coding: "We are deadly serious about turning the vision of 1798 and 1916 into a reality. I believe this generation of Irish republicans will do just that. It will not be easy. [...] This is our time. So, let us move the struggle forward. Let us keep building our strength. And let us keep our eye on the prize. The prize of freedom. Ar aghaidh linn le chéile" (taken from a speech held by SF-president Gerry Adams on June 20 th 2004).

The number of coded text passages which were found for each speech or statement was converted into an overall escalation value for every document. This was done according to a formula which was developed for this purpose (see below). The number of codes which were found for each escalation stage were multiplied with the actual value of the escalation stage (1-4). After that the results for the four stages were added up and the sum was then divided by the sum of codings found for the document in question. This would result in a value between 1 and 4, which would enable us to find out where on the escalation stage a particular party was at the time when this document was released.

formula:
$$x^{\text{Esk}} = \frac{a + 2b + 3c + 4d}{(a + b + c + d)}$$

example: if a = 1; b = 6; c = 10; d = 5; then:

$$x^{\text{Esk}} = \frac{1 + 2*6 + 3*10 + 4*4}{1 + 6 + 10 + 4}$$

$$x^{\text{Esk}} = \frac{1 + 12 + 30 + 16}{21}$$

$$x^{\text{Esk}} = \frac{59}{21}$$


$$x^{\text{Esk}} = 2,81$$

The weighting within this formula or, rather, the multiplication of the values with each escalation stage, can be justified by referring to the assumption that a higher escalation stage also implies higher conflict intensity. For this particular case study this would mean that the conflict parties' opposing perceived interests have moved up higher on the escalation scale and therefore moved into a regressive direction.

3.3.2.2 *The Results of the Qualitative CAQDAS-study dealing with the Parties' Opposing Interests*

As part of the qualitative evaluation of the documents the following results were reached: the perceived interests of the internal conflict parties have only moderately changed throughout the international mediation process. The following graph shows the four parties' movements on the escalation scale:

Figure 5 The party's perceived interests on the escalation scale



In the case of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) it should be mentioned, first of all, that the selection of documents only includes material from 1996 on, because the CAIN-database did not include earlier contributions. During this time the interests, here expressed by former party leader David Trimble, mainly move between the values 2 and 3 on the escalation scale (see Figure 5). In the periods shortly before, during and shortly after the achievement of the GFA in particular, one can detect intensive changes in the positioning of the party on the escalation scale. The most intensive reaction was measured on July 6th 1999; this was still before the revision process chaired by George Mitchell began in November of the same year. Throughout the following period the interests seem to de-escalate moderately by staying on stage II, the stage of "Integration or 'status quo'". Later on, they seem to become slightly more intense again, since they move above stage II. The dominant themes for the UUP were, in particular, paramilitary decommissioning and the securing of the union with Great Britain.

In relation to the more extreme Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) only four documents were available for analysis, but within these documents a drastic change could be detected (see Figure 5). Whereas the DUP's interests could still be located on stage IV – the highest stage on the escalation scale – in 1998, after the

achievement of the GFA, they moved down to stage III one year later and became even more moderate in 2004. This seems to be closely related to the party's recent election successes through which they shifted into a position of higher responsibility. Since the party is not in the opposition any longer, but rather at the top of Northern Ireland's political landscape, the DUP is forced to encourage change. Due to initiatives planned by the DUP, another revision process of the GFA began, which almost developed into a renegotiation of the original settlement. It remained to be seen at that point how this situation would turn out. The DUP's dominant themes were the securing of the union with Great Britain and, later on, the new design of the political institutions. It was not entirely clear, at that point in time, how integrative the DUP wanted these institutions to be. What did become evident was the fact that a change in the party's terminology had taken place, a symptom of a change in their power status and of an increase in responsibility, rather than of international influence.

The SDLP is often characterised as the most moderate party in Northern Ireland's political landscape, and throughout the document analysis this could be confirmed. The party's interests can primarily be found on stage II of the escalation scale with a tendency towards stage I, the stage of "Integration and access to political institutions" (see Figure 5). A more extreme reaction on the scale could be measured, for instance on July 25th 1997, but, apart from that, the topics for stage II seem to be so dominant that other reactions on the scale were balanced out. In mid-2003 and in 2004 more extreme reactions could be detected again which could partly be explained by a change in party leadership from John Hume to Mark Durkan. Durkan preferred a slightly different leadership style and therefore put more emphasis on topics like the strengthening of the party and its ideals. However, generally, the SDLP's dominant topics can be found on stage II of the escalation scale. At that stage the party calls for a complete implementation of the GFA and a realisation of the police reform and the "equality agenda". The fact that the SDLP suffered serious losses throughout recent elections could also be seen as an

explanatory aspect when looking at the more aggressive terminology of the years 2003 and 2004. The party seemed to feel pushed into the background by Sinn Féin. Especially in periods *between* the important negotiation phases the SDLP seems to be moving closer to stage I on the escalation scale. The party stresses its interests in access to institutional power and acts as a mediator between the other parties or rather as a kind of “peacekeeper”.

In comparison to the other parties Sinn Féin has produced the most documents, primarily speeches and statements by the party’s president Gerry Adams. This points to the fact that Sinn Féin seems to have a strong desire to promote its ideals. The developments on the escalation scale can be characterised as follows: on the whole, Sinn Féin’s perceived interests primarily move up and down between stages II and III of the escalation scale (see Figure 5). They seem to have developed in a similar pattern to those of the UUP. Important swings upwards can be detected shortly after the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement, a time during which Sinn Féin was not yet sure whether or not they were going to accept the document in the long run. The party had to justify its strategy change from the “armed struggle” to a long-term strategy aimed at Irish reunification to their supporters; therefore, only a slow change in party terminology seemed possible.

Another very extreme upward reaction on the escalation scale can be noted for February 3rd 2000. Sinn Féin’s last speech before the deadline of the original project was released on June 20th 2004, and it seemed as if the party was moving back to a higher stage on the escalation scale. Sinn Féin had recently achieved significant election successes – in Northern Ireland and to a much lesser extent in the Republic of Ireland – and was pursuing a strategy of strengthening and reorienting the party.

A large number of topics turned out to be dominant throughout Sinn Féin’s speeches, e.g. the realisation of the “equality agenda”. It should be noted, however, that the topic of an “equality agenda” just as the ideal of “self-determination” could be seen as a stand-in topic for the actual goal of reunification with the Republic. In

addition to this, a lot of references to the topic of “demilitarisation” could be found which can be interpreted as a modified version of the decommissioning topic, because Sinn Féin more than once insisted on the fact that “all” guns should be taken out of Irish politics (i.e. not just the weapons of the IRA, but also the weapons owned by loyalist groupings). In its essence, this can be seen as an evasive strategy which is being employed in order to avoid dealing with the topic of IRA decommissioning. After this analysis had been conducted, new developments and especially the influence of John de Chastelain and his IICD led to substantial acts of decommissioning, but Sinn Féin’s rhetoric at the time of this project could only be interpreted as evasive. Moreover, Sinn Féin’s values on the escalation scale did alter throughout the time period which was analysed, but it seems very obvious that an important terminological change had taken place. However, coming closer to mid-2004 there seemed to be a tendency towards a reversal of these terminological changes due to new developments and renewed deadlocks.


The question remains as to whether international mediators have contributed to these changes on the level of perceived interests or not?

3.4 Evaluation of the Overall Results of the Case Study – How much Influence did International Mediators Actually Have?

The results of the CAQDAS-study presented above can be combined with the other results gathered throughout this study, i.e. the analysis of the mediators’ strategies, since it is the actual objective of this study to find out whether or not international mediators have contributed to a de-escalation of the international conflict parties’ perceptions, or rather, their perceived interests. The following graph (Figure 6) combines the previous diagrams showing the developments of the conflict parties’ interests on the escalation scale with the evaluation of the international mediators’ strategies according to Touval and Zartman. For a detailed listing of the mediators’ identity, their activities and their interests, please consult the table which can be

found in the Appendix. Whereas the mediation activities on this scale only move between the values 1 and 3, the values representing the escalation scale range from 1 to 4. The two measuring scales have been merged here in order to visualise the development of the international mediators' strategies *parallel* to the development of the internal conflict parties' perceived interests on the escalation scale.

Figure 6 International mediation strategies versus the conflict parties' perceptual escalation



First of all, one can infer from this graph that the conflict parties' interests mainly seem to move around stage II on the escalation scale, with the UUP and, especially, the SDLP coming closer to stage I after the achievement of the GFA. The parties' interests seem to intensify again coming closer to 2004, especially in the cases of Sinn Féin and the SDLP. Only the DUP moves lower than stage II in the end.

The first and crucial act of mediation can be noted on February 1st 1994 when former US President Clinton granted Gerry Adams a 48-hour visa which made it possible for the Sinn Féin president to travel to the USA. At this point Sinn Féin's and the SDLP's interests are moving closer to stage I on the escalation scale, but are moving up to II again very shortly afterwards where they remain until mid-1997.

During his first official visit to Northern Ireland on November 30th 1995 US President Clinton mainly used *communication-facilitation strategies* which were

represented in his speeches at that time. Despite this visit the interests of Sinn Féin and of the SDLP still remain on stage II of the escalation scale. For the other parties no documents had been included on CAIN yet.

The next important development, which is also visible in Figure 6, is the publication of the “Mitchell-Report” which was released on January 22nd 1996 and in which the “Twin Track Initiative” was introduced. Despite the premature rejection of this report by the British government under Major, the negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement began on June 10th 1996. At this point the three parties Sinn Féin, the SDLP and the UUP could be found on a similar stage on the escalation scale: between integration and regression or rather at the “status quo” of the asymmetrical power relationship. On September 9th 1996 the next important development in relation to the international mediators’ strategies can be noted, because George Mitchell made an important statement on the condition of the negotiations in his function as one of the three independent chairmen. Shortly afterwards, the negotiations seemed to take a positive turn, but on February 9th 1997, the IRA broke their ceasefire, which had a very negative effect on the UUP’s perceived interests which moved back to stage III on the scale.

The negotiations were resumed after the IRA had renewed their ceasefire, which again had a de-escalating effect on the parties’ interests. Sinn Féin, in particular, was positioned very close to stage III on the escalation scale at the time of the signing of the GFA, because the party needed their members to ratify the document before they could take any further steps. However, in the case of Sinn Féin, a gradual de-escalation on the level of interests could be detected, which continued after a short relapse into escalation in the case of the UUP and the SDLP. This last decrease in intensity seemed to occur after Clinton’s second official visit, an event which seemed to ensure a return to a peaceful implementation process of the objectives laid out in the GFA after the “Real IRA” bomb attack on Omagh on August 15th 1998. While the DUP still remained on stage IV of the escalation scale at this time, the other three conflict parties also seemed to slowly move back to a

higher stage on the scale, at that point mainly due to a lack of movement in relation to the topic of paramilitary decommissioning, which prevented, among other things, a long-term establishment of the new political institutions in Northern Ireland. Especially in the case of the UUP one could now find the highest and, therefore, the most intense positioning on the escalation scale. Due to this, a revision process of the GFA was initiated on September 6th 1999, again under the chairmanship of former US Senator George Mitchell, who in this case preferred *communication-facilitation strategies* right from the outset, because this revision process was not supposed to become a renegotiation, but rather a clarification of contentious aspects. The closure of the Mitchell-Review and the increased activities of the IICD, which were happening as a consequence of this review, led to a parallel de-escalation of the interests. However, Sinn Féin actually moved towards the highest escalation stage – especially after Clinton’s appeal to Gerry Adams to finally solve the problem of decommissioning (*manipulative strategy*) – because the party felt under more pressure.

After further reports had been published by the IICD, which can be interpreted as belonging to the category of *formulation strategies*, Sinn Féin moved back towards a lower escalation stage and remained there until mid-2003, when their interests seemed to de-escalate for a short period. Unfortunately, this process of de-escalation is once more quickly substituted by a period of escalation, which lasted until mid-2004 (the cut-off point of this analysis). While Sinn Féin’s perceived interests did not move down to a lower escalation stage during or after Clinton’s next official visit, the intensity of the UUP’s and the SDLP’s perceived interests seemed to decrease slightly.

The activities of the weapons inspectors Ramaphosa and Ahtisaari during the year 2000 also did not seem to have an intense influence on the development of the internal conflict parties’ interests.

On March 16th 2001 the current US President George W. Bush made his first statement on Northern Ireland, which did not seem to have any impact on the

development of the perceived interests either. Throughout the year 2001 the UUP's escalation potential and to a lesser extent also the SDLP's escalation potential seemed to increase, despite the activities of the weapons inspectors and of the IICD. Bush's next statements also did not change the escalation pattern much.

On 10th September 2001 Richard Haass took over the position of "special ambassador" to Northern Ireland at the behest of the Bush administration, and he requested information on the state of the peace process from the Northern Ireland Office. A number of talks took place between Haass and UUP-leader Trimble, throughout which the UUP's interests once more seemed to move up the escalation scale.

Strangely, the contentious remark made by the "special ambassador" in relation to the possible serious consequences for Sinn Féin in case a connection between Republican groups and Columbian FARC-rebels existed, did not seem to have a real influence on Sinn Féin's perceived interests. However, Haass' remark represents the strong change in American foreign policy in relation to Northern Ireland. The administration now puts a greater emphasis on the aspect of terrorism than on the development of the peace process.

While the activities initiated by international actors have moved between stages I and II on the Touval and Zartman-scale of mediation strategies, since then, the regional elections in Northern Ireland have produced a result through which the two more extreme parties DUP and Sinn Féin found themselves in the strongest positions. As a consequence, Sinn Féin's terminology and interests moved back up to stage III on the escalation scale, the "Basic needs". In opposition to this, surprisingly, the DUP seems to have changed its interests substantially, at least in its rhetoric. As has been mentioned before, the DUP now found itself in a situation which it had not experienced before, a position of power and responsibility.

Generally, at this point one could pose the question of whether international actors actually had any real influence on the development of the opposing interests

at all throughout the peace process of the last ten years? Has a substantial degree of de-escalation of perceived interests actually taken place?

Whereas the amount of data for the first five years seems to be quite sparse in the case of some parties, it becomes evident for the later period, that the most crucial changes in the perceived interests at the time of international mediation efforts seem to be the achievement of the GFA, the Mitchell-Review and Clinton's strong appeal to Gerry Adams. Especially throughout these phases an important change on the level of the perceived interests has indeed taken place. Throughout the remaining time the interests seem to stay relatively constant.

However, it should not be ignored that both the negotiation efforts leading up to the GFA and the Mitchell-Review were formalised attempts at international mediation which both caused a lot of international attention. The Bush administration only took over when the peace process was already in the phase of GFA-implementation. At this point, both the British and Irish governments were already supposed to be much more involved again.

On the whole, it also becomes evident that the type and the number of resources controlled by international actors, especially throughout the Clinton era, played an important role. For example, activities initiated by the IICD did not necessarily seem to cause the same impact on the escalation scale as mediation efforts which were more directly supported by the US administration. The most important resources which were readily available for the American government then and which are still employed now are, for instance, economic "rewards" which are allocated to Northern Ireland from the International Fund for Ireland every year.

Taking into account the previous analysis one could therefore draw the overall conclusion that international mediation efforts have not led to a long-term change of the perceived interests. The successes on the structural level of conflict, e.g. the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement or the agreement between the parties after the Mitchell-Review, are also endangered again due to the relatively constant development on the level of perceptions. The changes on the structural

level could therefore not foster a long-term change on the level of perceptions, a potential consequence which had already been outlined in the theoretical part of this study. Instead, the opposing interests, which are very deeply rooted in the parties' ideologies, have actually led to renewed relapses on the structural level, which, in particular, could not be dealt with enough, or rather, which could not be appropriately balanced out by the Bush administration. Moreover, the intensity in mediation efforts decreased from the Clinton era to the Bush era.

International mediation efforts have therefore, indeed, led to a de-escalation of the parties' interests, but only temporarily, since this de-escalation has not remained constant. The intensity of the mediation efforts has since decreased more and more. However, when influence was being used by the US government recently, it seemed to be mainly pressure; by pressurising the parties to fight paramilitary activities in Northern Ireland, the US government confirmed the general American foreign policy strategy towards terrorism which was dominant at that time. As Bercovitch stresses more than once: no international actor would enter a conflict situation without pursuing his own interest.

An important reason for this development is the problem of parallel escalation and de-escalation. Due to the continuous interruption of the de-escalation activities – including those initiated by international actors – by paramilitary attacks, traditional, disruptive marches and other events, the conflict parties and their perceptions are subject to such dominant external influences, that they only seem to have limited freedom throughout negotiation processes. In addition to this, most of the international mediation activities only took place on the political level – the level of elites – but decisions which are made among the political ranks also have to be endorsed by society, i.e. they have to be accepted by the population. How the population perceives political processes has an impact on aspects like election results, which either widen or restrict the political actors' possibilities for action. Public opinion, therefore, plays a crucial role in conflict regulation, especially throughout implementation processes, as can also be seen in Northern Ireland.

However, when this study was conducted its primary aim was to show a certain tendency in the developments of the interests as perceived by the *political* parties involved. This should explain the relapses towards escalation on the structural level of the Northern Ireland conflict and it should help to assess the efficiency of international mediation activities as part of the political process for this particular case. Due to the fact that, according to Bercovitch, other context factors should also be taken into account in order to gain a complete picture of such a mediation process, one could certainly conduct further case studies which would set a slightly different emphasis.

As has been mentioned above, public opinion plays an important role for the long-term developments of such a conflict situation. It is significant how the political conflict parties perceive an agreement. But, this needs to be followed up by further initiatives ensuring endorsement on grassroots level, because otherwise political decisions can quickly be doubted again by the population.

This aspect also shows the limits of international mediation activities through official political channels. Parties can be empowered, agreements can be fostered, trust can be built, but all of this can easily be lost again if there is no appropriate follow-up dealing with long-term reconciliation issues and community peace-building measures. International mediation certainly turns international attention towards intra-national conflicts like Northern Ireland and it heightens the stakes. Therefore, international monitoring and informal international mediation activities should definitely remain part of the overall conflict regulation process.

4 Conclusion

Throughout this article the Northern Irish peace process of the ten years before 2004 has been examined, in order to find out how much influence international mediators had on the perception of interests by the four main internal political conflict parties. Primarily, an attempt was made to determine whether or not these mediation efforts

have led to a perceptual de-escalation process. As part of the previously outlined results it has been established that international mediators did indeed have a certain amount of influence, especially on the structural level of the conflict, but that they were not able to induce change substantial enough to lead to a long-term modification of the parties' positions. Even though such mediation efforts could have indeed fostered an alteration on the level of interests, it remains questionable to what extent very powerful international actors can achieve anything at all in a case like this. Due to their power and their resources, they can help create changes in the structure of the relationship between the conflict parties, by which the perceived interests could also change after some time, but this does not seem to resolve the underlying issues. As became evident in the case of Clinton, the former US President wanted to achieve a regulation of the conflict, but did not necessarily aim at a complete "resolution" of the conflict. Apart from that, he did indeed show great personal interest in this particular conflict situation, but this did cover up other interests like satisfying Irish-American lobbyists and the electorate and a confirmation of his general foreign policy strategy.

When looking at the Bush administration these interests can also be found, even though the share of "Track Two" diplomacy or, rather, of supportive communication-facilitation strategies seemed to be less than in the Clinton era. Bush stressed the fight against international terrorism and therefore also against terrorism in Northern Ireland much more than the continuous productive development of the peace process. The most recent international intervention just before the cut-off point of this analysis was the visit of the then newly appointed US government envoy Mitchell Reiss to the region, which seemed to be part of new initiatives to break the deadlock which had developed. However, these mediation efforts could also be evaluated as running parallel to the election campaign of mid-2004, in which the topic Northern Ireland again played a vital part. The Democratic presidential candidate Kerry had already mentioned Northern Ireland a few times as part of his

campaign and he also strongly criticised Bush's approach to the problem.³² He was actively supported both by Clinton as well as former US Senator George Mitchell, who had been intensely involved in the Northern Ireland peace process. At the time when this study was conducted it remained to be seen how the upcoming presidential elections would turn out and if the result would once more lead to a change in the American foreign policy approach towards Northern Ireland. The then seemingly "ripe" moment for new international initiatives, which had mainly arisen due to the election successes of the two more extreme parties Sinn Féin and DUP, had not yet been utilised. A new dynamic seemed to develop which left the door open for new international interventions.

As a final point in the original paper it was stressed that the efforts undertaken by international actors so far have partially been effective, but that they actually only delayed the real "escalation" of the conflict, i.e. another escalation on the level of the perceived interests. How future international actors would behave and if they would try once more to regulate this "deadlock"-situation must be monitored.

Over a year and a half has gone by since the original analysis and a lot has happened. The level of violence has increased, but mainly among Loyalist paramilitaries. A multi-million Pound bank robbery in Northern Ireland, which the police suspected had been committed by the IRA, turned the media's attention back to the IRA's criminal activities in general and heated up the political debate around Sinn Féin's position in the political arena. The changing level of tolerance among the population seemed to put more pressure on paramilitaries and increased chances for international actors, like the IICD, to step in. The IICD under de Chastelain then played a substantial role in bringing about significant acts of decommissioning by the IRA and a statement by the organisation which basically asked its members to

32 See Press Association: "Kerry condemns Bush's approach to Northern Ireland", Special Report, US elections 2004, Guardian Unlimited, 17.02.2004, (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uselections2004/story/0,13918,1150148,00.html>, date last viewed: 29.01.2006).

pursue their objectives through exclusively political channels from now on. This was definitely a breakthrough fostered by international actors, and constantly monitored by the US government under Bush. Both the British and Irish governments welcomed the moves and began to revitalise discussion about the re-establishment of the institutions in Northern Ireland in late 2005. The latest report by the International Monitoring Commission (IMC), published on Feb 1st 2006, is supposed to provide further information on paramilitary activity of the recent months, in particular, on alleged ongoing criminal activity by the IRA. The nature of this information is supposed to determine the governments' decision on future proceedings.

But despite this, the main issue in Northern Ireland still seems to be a lack of trust and the continuing existence of opposing interests pursued by the main parties involved. Again it remains to be seen whether we will witness another verbal "fudge" or whether the parties really wish to reach a workable compromise this time.

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The official news website of the White House
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.html> (date last viewed: 29.01.2006)

The official U.S. Department of State news website <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/>
(date last viewed: 29.01.2006).

The Northern Ireland election results can be found on the website of Ark Northern
Ireland – Social & Political Archive at <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/> (date
last viewed: 29.01.2006).

6 Appendix

The international mediators' identity, interests and applied mediation strategies

Date	Documents	Rank of the International Actor	Country	Organis./ State	Identity	Interests	Resources ³³	Strategy (1-3)	Specification of dominant strategies used by international mediators according to Touval and Zartman and further remarks
01.02.94	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Reorienting and intensifying of foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF (economic resources, e.g. International Fund for Ireland (IFI); granting of peace envoy; knowledge; personal reference)	3	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>reward a party concessions, change expectations, press a party to show flexibility, promise resources and threaten withdrawal;</i> Clinton grants a 48-hour visa to Gerry Adams (SF), due to which Republican paramilitary activists in Northern Ireland call a ceasefire; Clinton therefore created a "ripe moment" for new peace initiatives according to Zartman, because this initiative was realised shortly after the breakdown of the Brooke-Mayhew talks and also in relation to the existing political and military deadlock (The visa was issued for Feb 1 st , but was already granted in January 1994); this decision was carried by the White House only, in opposition to recommendations by the State Department and the Justice Departments; two more visas followed afterwards which granted even longer stays in the USA.
01.11.94	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Reorienting and intensifying of foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>identify issues and interests, gain trust and confidence of parties, develop a framework for understanding;</i> Clinton makes a statement, in which he gives Northern Ireland high priority in American foreign policy; apart from that, he stresses that economic growth and the creation of more employment in Northern Ireland should be supported.
18.05.95	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	USA	Senator George Mitchell in his function as "economic adviser" under Clinton	Strong confirmation of foreign policy; intense efforts to satisfy Irish-American lobbyists; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>identify issues and interests, avoid taking sides, develop a framework for understanding;</i> Beginning of the Conference on Trade and Investment, which was initiated by Clinton; this conference lasted from May 18 th to May 19 th 1995.

33 The evaluation of the international actor's resources has been conducted according to the categories developed by the authors French and Raven. They introduce six types of resources: reward resources (REW), coercive resources (CO), referent resources (REF), legitimacy resources (LE), expertise resources (EX), and informational resources (IN). These resources often determine the scope of action that an international mediator has. For further information on these types of resources see Bercovitch 1992, p. 19-20.

30.11.95	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Strong confirmation of foreign policy; intense efforts to satisfy Irish-American lobbyists; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF	1,2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>make contact with parties, gain the trust of parties, avoid taking sides, encourage meaningful communication, but also (closer to strategy II): highlight common interests, reduce tensions;</i> Clinton holds five speeches during his first official visit to Northern Ireland.
15.12.95	-	Former official representative of a large state, former official representative of a small state and official representative of the military of a large state in his individual capacity	USA, Canada, Finland	IBD	International Body on Decommissioning (Mitchell (at the time of the founding of the IBD still in his function as economic envoy), de Chastelain, Holkeri)	Broadening of personal experience and reputation; support	EX, IN	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>make contact with parties, identify issues and interests, clarify situation;</i> Meetings of the International Body on Decommissioning in Dublin and Belfast (meetings lasted until Dec 18 th 1995).
11.01.96	-	Former official representative of a large state, former official representative of a small state and official representative of the military of a large state in his individual capacity	USA, Canada, Finland	IBD	International Body on Decommissioning (Mitchell (at the time of the founding of the IBD still in his function as economic envoy), de Chastelain, Holkeri)	Broadening of personal experience and reputation; support	EX, IN	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>make contact with parties, identify issues and interests, clarify situation;</i> Meetings of the International Body on Decommissioning in London (meetings lasted until Jan 22 nd 1996).
22.01.96	-	Former official representative of a large state, former official representative of a small state and official representative of the military of a large state in his individual capacity	USA, Canada, Finland	IBD	International Body on Decommissioning (Mitchell (at the time of the founding of the IBD still in his function as economic envoy), de Chastelain, Holkeri)	Broadening of personal experience and reputation; support	EX, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>suggest procedures, control pace and formality of meetings, control timing;</i> The International Body on Decommissioning, originally founded by the British and Irish governments, publishes the Mitchell-Report on the "Twin-track"-initiative, which proposes to deal with the issue of paramilitary decommissioning parallel to the negotiations; the IBD had an advisory function, without the power to impose solutions; introduction of the "Mitchell Principles" as "code of conduct"; proposal to create the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD).
10.06.96	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Independent Chairmen: mainly former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, IN (access to economic resources as Clinton's economic adviser on Ireland; knowledge, information; these resources are not as strong as those of the US President himself, but Mitchell is in very close contact with highly ranked American decision-makers)	1,5	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>make contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of parties, clarify situation, develop a rapport with parties, encourage meaningful communication, but also (closer to strategy II): choose meeting site, control physical environment, structure agenda, suggest procedures;</i> Beginning of the negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement; pre-negotiations: agreement on agenda and procedures; Sinn Féin was not allowed to take part yet, because the IRA-ceasefire had not been renewed yet at this point.
09.09.96	X	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell on behalf of the three Independent Chairmen	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, IN	3	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>press the parties to show flexibility (encourage the parties to make "rapid substantive progress" on the issues they are dealing with);</i> Statement of the Independent Chairmen
06.12.96	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Strong confirmation of foreign policy; intense efforts to satisfy Irish-American lobbyists; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>highlight common interests, reduce tensions, keep process focused on issues;</i> Talks between Clinton and Adams at the occasion of the annual St. Patrick's Day celebrations

13.01.97	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	No explicit reference in the document; function of the speech as such: confirmation of the American foreign policy strategy	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>encourage meaningful communication, offer positive evaluations;</i> Statement on the restart of the negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement
13.01.97	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, IN, LE (legitimacy now confirmed)	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control pace and formality of meetings, establish protocol, control timing, structure agenda, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues;</i> Restart of the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement
05.03.97	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, IN, LE	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control pace and formality of meetings, establish protocol, control timing, structure agenda, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues;</i> Statement on the end of the first part of the negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement
05.03.97	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Strong confirmation of foreign policy; intense efforts to satisfy Irish-American lobbyists; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>gain the trust and confidence of the parties, encourage meaningful communication, offer positive evaluations;</i> Speech on the support for the peace process.
12.01.98	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, REF	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control pace and formality of meetings, establish protocol, control timing, structure agenda, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues;</i> Restart of the negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement.
26.01.98	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, REF	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control physical environment;</i> GFA-negotiations are relocated to London.
27.01.98	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, REF	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control pace and formality of meetings, establish protocol, control timing, structure agenda, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues, control physical environment;</i> Further negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement in London.
13.03.98	X	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, REF	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>highlight common interests, keep process focused on issues;</i> Mitchell-discussion paper
18.03.98	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	No explicit reference in the document; function of document: confirmation of American foreign policy strategy	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>clarify situation, encourage meaningful communication, identify (unresolved) issues;</i> Joint statement by Clinton, Blair and Ahern
25.03.98	X	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, REF	2,3	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control timing, but also (closer to strategy III): make substantive suggestions and proposals;</i> Statement by Mitchell, in which he reschedules the deadline for the GFA-negotiations for one month earlier. This can be regarded as one of Mitchell's most important strategic decisions throughout the mediation process.

06.04.98	X	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, REF	3	Zartman/Touval-strategies: make substantive suggestions and proposals, attempt at changing parties' expectations, help devise a framework for acceptable outcome; Mitchell-Draft Paper
10.04.98	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Strong confirmation of foreign policy; intense efforts to satisfy Irish-American lobbyists; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: make contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of parties, develop a rapport with parties, develop a framework for understanding; Personal telephone calls between Clinton and Mitchell, Clinton and representatives of the British and Irish governments and between Clinton and leaders of the internal conflict parties in Northern Ireland.
10.04.98	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA, Canada, Finland	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell (supported by de Chastelain and Holkeri)	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy and his own strategy; personal interest; broadening of experience; reputation	REW, CO, EX, REF	3	Zartman/Touval-strategies: change the parties' expectations, reward party concessions, help devise framework for acceptable outcome, press the parties to show flexibility; Signing of the Good Friday Agreement; intensive participation of the Independent Chairmen
03.09.98	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy; satisfy Irish-American lobbyists	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: gain the trust and confidence of parties, clarify issues and interests, encourage meaningful understanding; Speech during his second official visit to Northern Ireland
17.03.99	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	No existing document	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: highlight common interests, reduce tensions, keep process focused on issues Speech at the annual St. Patrick's Day celebrations
02.07.99	-	Official representative of the military of a large state and former official representative of a small state	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: suggest procedures; IICD was founded by means of a joint initiative of the British and Irish governments on Aug 27 th 1998; report
06.09.99	X	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy; conservation of the previously achieved results; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF, LE, IN (here also REF, due to personal reference)	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: gain the trust and confidence of parties, arrange for interactions between parties, clarify situation, develop a framework for understanding; Statement; beginning of the GFA-revision process
23.10.99	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy; conservation of the previously achieved results; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF, LE, IN	1,5	Zartman/Touval-strategies: arrange for interactions between the parties, allow the interests of all parties to be discussed, but also (closer to strategy II): structure agenda, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues; Extension of the GFA-revision process
11.11.99	-	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy; conservation of the previously achieved results; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF, LE, IN	1,5	Zartman/Touval-strategies: arrange for interactions between the parties, allow the interests of all parties to be discussed, but also (closer to strategy II): structure agenda, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues; Further talks as part of the GFA-revision process
15.11.99	X	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy; conservation of the previously achieved results; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: control pace and formality of meetings, keep parties at table, keep process focused on issues; Statement as part of the GFA-revision process

15.11.99	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: suggest procedures, reduce tensions, control timing; Statement
18.11.99	X	Former official representative of a large state with official support of this state	USA	Ind. Chairmen	Former Senator George Mitchell	Supporting the American foreign policy strategy; conservation of the previously achieved results; personal interest	REW, CO, EX, REF, LEG, IN	1,7	Zartman/Touval-strategies: encourage meaningful communication (strategy belonging to type I), make parties aware of costs of non-agreement (strategy belonging to type III); the strategy belonging to type I was stronger, but the mixture between I and III leads to value 1,7; Statement on the conclusion of the GFA-revision process; publication of Mitchell-Plan
10.12.99	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: suggest procedures, control timing, structure agenda; Report
12.01.00	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Confirmation of the supporting foreign policy strategy	REW, CO, EX, REF	3	Zartman/Touval-strategies: change parties' expectations, suggest concessions a party can make, press a party to make concessions, promise resources or threaten withdrawal; Appeal to Gerry Adams; he should finally resolve the problem of decommissioning
31.01.00	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: suggest procedures, control timing, structure agenda; Report
11.02.00	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: suggest procedures, control timing, structure agenda; Report
15.05.00	-	Former official representatives of states in their individual capacities	South Africa, Finland	Others	Weapons Inspectors (Cyril Ramaphosa and Marthi Ahtisaari)	Broadening of personal experience	EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: keep parties at the table, suggest procedures, help parties save face; Talks with the NI-parties
26.06.00	-	Former official representatives of states in their individual capacities	South Africa, Finland	Others	Weapons Inspectors (Cyril Ramaphosa and Marthi Ahtisaari)	Broadening of personal experience	EX, LE, IN	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: supply missing information; Confirmation that an inspection of IRA-weapons had taken place
26.10.00	-	Former official representatives of states in their individual capacities	South Africa, Finland	Others	Weapons Inspectors (Cyril Ramaphosa and Marthi Ahtisaari)	Broadening of personal experience	EX, LE, IN	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: supply missing information; Declaration that a second IRA-weapons inspection had taken place
12.12.00	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Strong personal interest; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists	REW, CO, EX, REF	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: encourage meaningful communication, identify issues and interests; Speech during his third official visit to Northern Ireland
13.12.00	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Clinton	Strong personal interest; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; strong confirmation of foreign policy strategy	REW, CO, EX, REF	1,8	Zartman/Touval-strategies: encourage meaningful communication, offer positive evaluations (strategies belonging to type I), but also: highlight common interests (belonging to type II), and make parties aware of costs of non-agreement, press the parties to show flexibility and promise resources or threaten withdrawal (belonging to type III); due to the mixture of the different strategies the strategy value in this case is 1,8; Speech during his third official visit to Northern Ireland

16.03.01	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Satisfying Irish-American lobbyists and confirmation of supporting foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX (economic resources, e.g. IFI, possibility of a peace envoy, knowledge)	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>encourage meaningful communication, clarify situation;</i> Joint Statement by Bush and Ahern; speech at the occasion of the annual St. Patrick's Day celebrations
23.05.01	-	Former highly ranked official of a large state in his individual capacity	USA	Others	Former US President Clinton	Strong personal interest; reputation	EX, REF (because not in his position anymore, therefore no power over REW)	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>encourage meaningful communication;</i> Support of the peace efforts in Northern Ireland in his individual capacity
30.05.01	-	Former official representatives of states in their individual capacities	South Africa, Finland	Others	Weapons Inspectors (Cyril Ramaphosa and Marthi Ahtisaari)	Broadening of personal experience	EX, LE, IN	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>supply missing information;</i> Statement on the third IRA-weapons inspection
30.06.01	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>structure agenda, suggest procedures;</i> Report
02.07.01	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>keep process focused on issues;</i> Statement (no progress on decommissioning)
01.08.01	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1,5	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>encourage meaningful communication, offer positive evaluations (belonging to strategy type I), but also: keep process focused on issues, highlight common interests (belonging to type II); due to the mixture of strategies represented in the document, the strategy value in this case is 1,5;</i> Facilitating statement
06.08.01	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>suggest procedures, control timing;</i> Report
10.09.01	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; (increase in positive reputation)	RE, CO, EX (these resources are not as strongly present as in the case of the US President, but Haass does have access to very important decision-makers)	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>identify issues and interests, clarify situation;</i> Haass would like to be informed on the state of the peace process by the NIO
11.09.01	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; (increase in positive reputation)	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>identify issues and interests, clarify situation;</i> Haass meets with representatives of the NIO for an update on the current state of the peace process
09.10.01	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues, reduce tensions;</i> Meeting between de Chastelain and Trimble

12.10.01	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; (increase in positive reputation)	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>make contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of the parties, identify issues and interests;</i> Talks between Haass and Trimble in Washington
13.10.01	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; (increase in positive reputation)	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>make contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of the parties, identify issues and interests;</i> Talks between Haass and Trimble in Washington
15.10.01	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; (increase in positive reputation)	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>make contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of the parties, identify issues and interests;</i> Talks between Haass and Trimble in Washington; "constructive meeting"
16.10.01	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control timing, keep process focused on issues;</i> Confirmation that IRA-decommissioning has begun
21.10.01	-	Administration of a large state	USA	USA	Representative of US administration under Bush	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists	RE, CO, EX	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control pace and formality of meetings, highlight common interests;</i> Meeting between McGuinness (SF) and representatives of the American government (also: meeting between McGuinness and representatives of the Irish-American lobby groups)
23.10.01	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>suggest procedures, control timing;</i> Report
23.10.01	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>control timing; keep process focused on issues;</i> Statement after the decommissioning of some IRA-weapons
23.10.01	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>offer positive evaluations, encourage meaningful communication;</i> Statement
31.10.01	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>suggest procedures, highlight common interests, keep parties at the table;</i> Meeting of IICD-representatives with members of the UUP
08.11.01	-	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: <i>gain the trust and confidence of the parties, identify issues and interests, encourage meaningful communication;</i> Meeting with Ahern; Bush speaks of strong support for the peace process

07.01.02	X	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; (increase in positive reputation)	RE, CO, EX	1,8	Zartman/Touval-strategies: clarify situation, avoid taking sides (belonging to type I), but also: make parties aware of costs of non-agreement, promise resources or threaten withdrawal (belonging to type III), due to the weighting of the various strategies, the strategy value in this case is 1,8; Speech on the Northern Irish peace process to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
16.01.02	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; (increase in positive reputation)	RE, CO, EX	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: reduce tensions, highlight common interests, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues; Meeting between Haass and NIO-representative Reid; and between Haass and NI-parties on the topic of policing in Northern Ireland
17.01.02	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists; (increase in positive reputation)	RE, CO, EX	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: reduce tensions, highlight common interests, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues; Meeting between Haass and NI parties
02.02.02	-	Administration of a large state	USA	USA	US administration	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of the parties; identify issues and interests; US-invitation: Trimble and Durkan travel to Washington to witness the opening of the Northern Ireland Bureau; visit lasts one week
06.02.02	-	Administration of a large state	USA	USA	US administration	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of the parties; identify issues and interests; Opening of the Northern Ireland Bureau
12.03.02	-	Administration of a large state	USA	USA	US administration	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: contact with parties, gain the trust and confidence of the parties; identify issues and interests; Further festivities at the opening of the Northern Ireland Bureau
13.03.02	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: highlight common interests, reduce tensions, keep process focused on issues Speech at the occasion of the annual St. Patrick's Day celebrations
08.04.02	X	Representative of a highly ranked official of a large state	USA	USA	US-Press Secretary under Bush	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1,5	Zartman/Touval-strategies: encourage meaningful communication (type I), keep process focused on issues (type II); Statement on behalf of the Bush administration
11.05.02	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass	Strong confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	3	Zartman/Touval-strategies: promise resources or threaten withdrawal; Statement that connections between Northern Irish Republicans and Columbian guerrillas would have serious consequences
24.07.02	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: offer positive evaluations (type I), but also: press the parties to show flexibility and threaten withdrawal of resources (type III); due to the mixture of strategies, the value here is 2; Facilitating, yet pressurising statement
14.10.02	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: identify issues and interests, offer positive evaluations; Facilitating Statement
20.11.02	X	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: gain the trust and confidence of the parties, offer positive evaluations, develop a framework for understanding; Speech to economic and political representatives of Northern Ireland
13.03.03	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: highlight common interests, reduce tensions, keep process focused on issues; Speech at the occasion of the annual St. Patrick's Day celebrations

19.03.03	X	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists	RE, CO, EX	1,7	Zartman/Touval-strategies: identify issues and interests; keep process focused on issues; Speech on the topic of an integrated education system for Northern Ireland; the speech was held in front of the American Ireland Fund
08.04.03	X	Highly ranked official representative of a large state	USA	USA	US President Bush	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: gain the trust and confidence of the parties, develop a framework for understanding, identify (unresolved) issues; Joint Statement by Bush, Blair and Ahern, which was meant to revitalise the peace process in the context of Bush's official visit to Hillsborough, Northern Ireland
04.09.03	-	Individual	USA	And.	Kerr / IMC	Broadening of personal experience	EX, LE	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: supply missing information; Richard Kerr becomes a member of the Independent Monitoring Commission (which consists of four members overall); this commission was founded to monitor paramilitary ceasefires and other elements of the GFA
14.10.03	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Special ambassador Richard Haass; Director of Policy Planning (State Department)	No existing document; confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: offer positive evaluations; Statement that he is optimistic in relation to the upcoming elections to the NI-Assembly and the reestablishment of devolution, after he finished talks with the relevant parties
21.10.03	-	Official representatives of the military, and of a small and a large state in their individual capacities	USA, Canada, Finland	IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (General de Chastelain, Harri Holkeri and Andy Sens)	Broadening of experience and of reputation; supporting the governments	CO, EX, LE, IN	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: suggest procedures, control timing; Report
29.10.03	X	Representative of a highly ranked official of a large state	USA	USA	US-Press Secretary under Bush	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	1	Zartman/Touval-strategies: identify issues and encourage meaningful communication; Statement on behalf of the Bush administration
16.03.04	-	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Peace envoy Mitchell Reiss	Confirmation of Bush's foreign policy strategy; satisfying Irish-American lobbyists	RE, CO, EX	1,3	Zartman/Touval-strategies: make contact with the parties, gain the trust and confidence of the parties, identify issues and interests, develop a rapport with the parties, encourage meaningful understanding (belonging to type I), but also: control pace and formality of meetings, control timing, keep parties at the table, keep process focused on issues (belonging to type II); due to the mixture and weighting of the various strategies, the strategy value in this case is 1,3; Speech on the topic of human rights and policing in Northern Ireland to the US-Helsinki Commission in Washington
01.07.04	X	Official representative of a large state	USA	US-envoy	Peace envoy Mitchell Reiss	Confirmation of foreign policy strategy	RE, CO, EX	2	Zartman/Touval-strategies: keep parties at the table, suggest procedures, highlight common interests, reduce tension, keep process focused on issues; Meetings with NI-parties; SF and DUP should start a dialogue with one another, in order to resolve the deadlock-situation

Analysis of the internal conflict parties' perceived interests as a basis for the escalation scale

The analysis was conducted with the help of the CAQDAS-program "maxqda". The conflict parties' interests were coded according to the previously developed categories of preferred interests and contentious topics and then sorted according to the appropriate four stages of the modified escalation model.

Abbreviations: uup: Ulster Unionist Party; dup: Democratic Unionist Party; sldp: Social Democratic and Labour Party; re: speech; st: statement; gst: joint statement, sf: Sinn Féin; uuc: Ulster Unionist Council; tr: Trimble; pais: Paisley; hu: Hume; ma: Mallon; du: Durkan; ad: Adams; cl: Clinton; nobel: nobel price; nif: Northern Ireland Forum; br: British government; mcg: McGuinness

Translations: Datum: date; Faktor: factor; Stufe: stage; Art. Dok.: type of document; Akteur: actor

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)

Datum	Faktor		Stufe I	Stufe II	Stufe III	Stufe IV	Art. Dok.	Akteur
23.03.1996	1,87	uup	8	10	5	0	re/uuc	tr
04.02.1998	2,50	uup	1	0	3	0	br/ad	tr
21.03.1998	1,64	uup	8	3	3	0	re/uuc	tr
17.04.1998	2,20	uup	6	4	10	0	re/nif	tr
03.09.1998	1,62	uup	8	2	3	0	re/mit cl	tr
24.10.1998	2,00	uup	7	5	7	0	re/uup	tr
18.11.1998	2,00	uup	1	1	1	0	gst/mit ma	tr
10.12.1998	1,57	uup	4	2	1	0	re/nobel	tr
20.03.1999	1,71	uup	7	4	3	0	re/uuc	tr
28.06.1999	2,20	uup	2	0	3	0	st	tr
06.07.1999	2,83	uup	0	1	5	0	artikel	tr
15.07.1999	2,21	uup	3	5	6	0	artikel	tr
08.10.1999	2,18	uup	2	5	4	0	st	tr
23.10.1999	1,76	uup	8	5	4	0	artikel	tr
16.11.1999	1,73	uup	5	4	2	0	re/stor	tr
02.02.2000	2,00	uup	3	3	3	0	artikel	tr
14.04.2000	2,08	uup	4	4	5	0	re/komm	tr
21.05.2000	2,00	uup	4	3	4	0	artikel	tr
13.12.2000	1,58	uup	7	3	2	0	re/mit cl	tr
17.11.2001	2,47	uup	1	7	9	0	re/uup	tr
19.10.2002	2,11	uup	9	7	12	0	re/uup	tr
18.10.2003	2,41	uup	6	4	17	0	re/uup	tr
21.10.2003	2,33	uup	1	0	2	0	st/iied	tr
03.02.2004	2,33	uup	3	2	7	0	st/rev	tr
27.03.2004	2,45	uup	3	0	8	0	re/uup	tr

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)

Datum	Faktor		Stufe I	Stufe II	Stufe III	Stufe IV	Art.Dok.	Akteur
28.11.1998	4,00	dup	0	0	0	4	re/dup	pais
24.11.2001	3,11	dup	0	0	8	1	re/dup	pais
08.05.2004	2,89	dup	0	2	6	1	re/dup	pais
25.06.2004	1,89	dup	3	4	2	0	st	pais

Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)

Datum	Faktor		Stufe I	Stufe II	Stufe III	Stufe IV	Art.Dok.	Akteur
24.04.1993	1,71	sldp	3	3	1	0	gst/sf	hu
25.09.1993	1,67	sldp	1	2	0	0	gst/sf	hu
20.11.1993	1,33	sldp	2	1	0	0	gst/sf	hu
28.08.1994	1,86	sldp	2	4	1	0	gst/sf	hu
18.07.1997	2,00	sldp	2	3	2	0	gst/sf	hu
25.07.1997	2,33	sldp	0	2	1	0	gst/sf/br	hu
03.09.1998	1,60	sldp	2	3	0	0	re/mit cl	ma
13.11.1998	1,61	sldp	7	11	0	0	re/sdlp	ma
14.11.1998	1,60	sldp	17	15	3	0	re/sdlp	hu
18.11.1998	2,00	sldp	1	1	1	0	st/mit tr	ma
10.12.1998	1,17	sldp	10	2	0	0	re/nobel	hu
15.07.1999	1,50	sldp	3	3	0	0	st/resig.	ma
05.11.1999	1,80	sldp	6	12	2	0	re/sdlp	ma
06.11.1999	1,44	sldp	15	12	0	0	re/sdlp	hu
16.11.1999	1,75	sldp	1	3	0	0	st	sdlp
07.02.2000	1,33	sldp	2	1	0	0	artikel	hu
13.12.2000	1,25	sldp	3	1	0	0	re/mit cl	ma
11.11.2001	1,76	sldp	8	15	2	0	re/sdlp	du
02.11.2002	1,88	sldp	11	25	4	1	re/sdlp	du
26.04.2003	2,12	sldp	11	11	7	4	re/ir.asso	du
03.02.2004	1,81	sldp	5	15	1	0	re/rev	du
21.02.2004	2,07	sldp	6	33	5	2	re/sdlp	du

Sinn Féin (SF)

Datum	Faktor		Stufe I	Stufe II	Stufe III	Stufe IV	Art.Dok.	Akteur
24.04.1993	1,71	sf	3	3	1	0	gst/sdlp	ad
25.09.1993	1,50	sf	1	1	0	0	gst/sdlp	ad
20.11.1993	1,33	sf	2	1	0	0	gst/sdlp	ad
28.08.1994	1,86	sf	2	4	1	0	gst/sdlp	ad
02.01.1995	2,00	sf	1	6	1	0	artikel	ad
18.07.1997	2,00	sf	2	3	2	0	gst/sdlp	ad
25.07.1997	2,33	sf	0	2	1	0	gst/sdlp/br	ad
07.08.1997	2,11	sf	2	4	3	0	paper	sf
05.02.1998	2,00	sf	2	4	2	0	st	ad
18.04.1998	2,76	sf	4	10	15	9	re/sf	ad
10.05.1998	2,43	sf	6	6	17	1	re/sf	ad
01.09.1998	2,00	sf	0	3	0	0	st	ad
09.05.1999	2,24	sf	10	19	20	1	re/sf	ad
14.07.1999	2,33	sf	2	8	8	0	artikel	ad
02.10.1999	2,40	sf	0	3	2	0	re/sf	ad
18.10.1999	2,07	sf	3	7	4	0	st	ad
21.10.1999	2,29	sf	1	3	3	0	st	ad
16.11.1999	2,43	sf	0	4	3	0	st	ad
22.11.1999	2,00	sf	1	2	1	0	st	ad
24.11.1999	2,00	sf	10	14	10	0	re/sf	ad
27.01.2000	2,10	sf	8	10	11	0	re/sf	ad
03.02.2000	3,00	sf	0	0	2	0	st	ad
03.02.2000	2,57	sf	0	3	4	0	artikel	ad
11.02.2000	2,33	sf	1	2	3	0	st	ad
12.02.2000	2,17	sf	2	1	3	0	st	ad
27.02.2000	2,40	sf	2	11	12	0	re/sf	ad
07.03.2000	2,40	sf	0	6	4	0	artikel	ad
08.04.2000	2,32	sf	5	16	17	0	re/sf	ad
19.05.2000	2,27	sf	1	6	4	0	st	ad
29.10.2000	2,27	sf	1	9	5	0	re/sf	ad
22.10.2001	2,27	sf	2	12	8	0	re/sf	ad
17.10.2002	2,24	sf	8	13	17	0	re/resp.bl	ad
08.02.2003	2,24	sf	2	12	7	0	re/sf	ad
29.03.2003	2,12	sf	8	27	14	0	re/sf	ad
30.03.2003	2,15	sf	3	11	6	0	re/sf	mcg
27.04.2003	1,68	sf	7	11	1	0	re/stor	ad
30.04.2003	1,75	sf	1	3	0	0	st	ad
21.10.2003	1,84	sf	8	13	4	0	re/sf	ad
15.01.2004	2,00	sf	7	14	7	0	re	ad
03.02.2004	2,00	sf	2	8	2	0	st/rev	ad
28.02.2004	2,20	sf	3	26	11	0	re/sf	ad
20.06.2004	2,60	sf	3	5	9	3	re/sf	ad

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